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The Chairman. Will those standing please take a seat and please conversation? Then we will get this hearing underway.

As we closed yesterday, we had been discussing

Senator Chafee's amendment. It was the pending amendment,
and then we had further comments by Senator Durenberger as to
one that he proposes to, as I recall, delete the entire
targeting provision. But I would like to proceed on Senator
Chafee's amendment, and if it prevails we will recognize

Senator Durenberger for an up or down on the entire.

Senator Chafee. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As you recall, what my amendment did was to say that, if the President decides -- and a copy of this will be passed around -- if the President decides that the export targeting exists but that he does not choose to take retaliatory action, then he has to convene the private sector panel to advise him within six months on non-trade measures to restore the competitiveness of the U.S. industry that is the victim of the targeting.

What do we mean by non-trade measures? Well, they could be regulatory relief, or preferential government procurement, or worker retraining -- we have probably taken care of that -- or R&D support. Those are some of the options.

Now, Mr. Chairman, when I proposed this amendment there was some concern evidenced that the President must implement these. In the amendment that I have circulated to you, that

becomes optional, and that is the President may do this; this 2 gives him these options. And I would amend my amendment to 3 that extent. The Chairman. With no objection, that will be accepted 5 as an amendment to his amendment. Are there further comments on the proposal of Senator 6 7 Chafee? 8 Senator Durenberger. Mr. Chairman, just very briefly and . 9 I will leave my other arguments until later, I support 10 Senator Chafee's amendment. I think it recognizes the realities of targeting, which my amendment does also. So, 11 I intend to support it, and I think we all should. 12 The Chairman. Thank you. 13 Are there further comments? 14 (No response) 15 The Chairman. If not, do you move the amendment? 16 Senator Chafee. I do, Mr. Chairman. 17 The Chairman. All in favor of the motion, indicate by 18 saying Aye. 19 (Chorus of Ayes) 20 The Chairman. Opposed? 21 (No response) 22 The Chairman. Motion carried. 23 Senator Durenberger? 24 Senator Durenberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I 25

intend to be brief.

My amendment simply deletes section 305(c) of S. 490 as it relates to defining export targeting as an unreasonable practice.

Yesterday we had a very interesting discussion on whether we in this country could respond to Japanese industrial targeting practices by adopting similar partnerships between government, finance, and business; but Ambassador Woods correctly noted, if we adopt the targeting language in the bill, our trading partners could easily adopt mirror legislation that could be used to challenge, as unlawful, U.S. Government policies that benefit, for example, our timber, oil, rice, and semiconductor industries.

I don't want to prolong the debate over whether this country has the capability and the political will to meet the challenge from Miti or say some of the more socialized countries of Eastern Europe and other parts of the world by adopting practices similar to those used by Miti. But I think it would be unwise to close off the option of doing something on purpose for the United States, unless we can be assured that other governments abandon their targeting efforts.

Last year we spent a great deal of time in this committee trying to level the domestic economic playing field by making the Tax Code more neutral in its effect on U.S. industries.

As legislators we made it within our power to make such

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decisions which affect our domestic industries. But I would suggest that we in the United States Congress are not capable of outlawing foreign government actions that are inconsistent with our conception of what the relationship between government and business ought to be.

I would be happy to withdraw my amendment to strike the targeting language in S. 490, if there was a way I could be assured that by outlawing targeting, Japan would close Miti -- or France or West Germany and Great Britain would cease targeting the computer and microelectronics industries, or that South Korea would no longer target machine tools and automobiles. But until I am assured, Mr. Chairman, that other countries will end their targeting practices, it seems unreasonable for the United States to close this policy option for ourselves while the global economy playing field is unbalanced.

One of the principal negotiating objectives, Mr. Chairman, for the upcoming GATT Round that we have set in S. 490 is a revision of the Gatt Articles necessary to define and discipline adverse trade effects resulting from targeting.

In my opinion, the Uruguay Round is the appropriate place to settle this issue, not the Finance Committee. If we are to see an end to industrial targeting by our trading partners, we are going to have to negotiate with them to end this practice, and I would suggest it is shortsighted to go

to the bargaining table without having the option of telling them: "If you don't end your targeting practices, we in the United States will use our financial and political resources to match your targeting efforts."

Mr. Chairman, outlawing a foreign government practice does not necessarily mean the end of that practice. In 1928 the United States signed the Kellog-Brion Pact outlawing war. We know that didn't lead to resolving that problem. And the same, I would say, holds true for targeting.

If we can't get our trading partners to make concrete commitments to end targeting, then I believe we as a nation will have to reconsider how we respond to foreign government targeting, and I would suggest that the appropriate action for us to take is to delete the reference to targeting as an unfair practice.

The Chairman. What page are we on, Mr. Lang?

Mr. Lang. On page 63 at the middle of the spreadsheet you will find the provision of the Bentsen/Danforth bill on targeting.

Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes, Senator Chafee.

Senator Chafee. At your convenience I would be prepared to address this.

The Chairman. That is fine, Senator; you are recognized for that purpose.

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Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, this is a major point, as we noted yesterday, that Senator Durenberger is raising. The question is whether we are going to make targeting actionable on behalf of the U.S., or whether we leave it out and we try countertargeting by us targeting.

Mr. Chairman, I just think that is wishful thinking, that we are going to be successful at this business. I think we all know that as soon as there is any suggestion of the U.S. Government picking winners or losers, that the decision is to stay out of that business and let the free market work. However, there is no question but what other countries are targeting. We have mentioned Japan, but that is not the only one. And it is the ultimate of a mercantilistic act. It is a decision by a government to make its producers of certain products competitive on a world-wide basis; and furthermore, it is going into future industries that this comes up -whether it is fiberoptics, semiconductors, superconductors, or supercomputers. Whatever it is, these are the things that are chosen to target.

Mr. Chairman, this is going to be an increasing practice unless the United States takes action and is prepared to take action as provided for in this legislation that makes it an actionable measure under 301.

I think we would be making a serious mistake, Mr. Chairman, if we dropped this; because I believe, as I stated in the

beginning of my remarks, that the U.S. is just not going to be successful at this kind of game.

The Chairman. Further comments? Senator Moynihan?

Senator Moynihan. Mr. Chairman, just as a question of fact, what is "targeting"? Could Ambassador Woods tell us?

Are we being targeted? What is "targeting" as against "merchandising"?

Mr. Woods. Senator, our problem with this amendment and with this provision of the bill is that, first of all, we believe that targeting is actionable already under section 301 of the trade laws.

Senator Moynihan. It so says, yes. But what is "targeting"?

Mr. Woods. That is the problem, that this business tries to define it.

I recall a question that Senator Packwood asked me when I came up here to be confirmed. He asked me what an "unfair trade practice" was. I was new to this business, and I stumbled through it, and finally Senator Danforth came to my rescue and said, "Well, it is like pornography; you know it when you see it." Targeting falls into that kind of a category, it seems to me. It is almost impossible to define, as it can be combinations of things that nobody has thought of yet. It is very hard to get your hands around what this practice actulally is, but you sort of know it when you see it.

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Senator Moynihan. Where do you see it right now?

Mr. Woods. Well, we have felt that we have seen it in the Japanese semiconductor industry, and in fact that is one of the reasons why we went after the semiconductor industry the way we did. In that instance it was a combination, we believe, of the dumping of the product in combination with the protection of the home market in Japan. So, we went after both: product dumping and home market protection. We believe we see that in supercomputers.

And I might add, in relation to something that was said yesterday, we now have the Japanese prepared to negotiate on that subject, which they weren't some days ago. That was one of the --

Senator Moynihan. I am not trying to test you on this, but could I just ask our committee here: There is something well known, and one of the most distinct phenomenons of the twentieth century world trade, as the "product cycle." It has been well established. And being the most technologically advanced country for most of the century, we have had the most experience with the product cycles.

In that cycle, as something gets thought up and manufactured here, and it begins to be sold abroad, then it begins to be manufactured abroad and sold abroad, then it begins to be manufactured abroad and sold back here. I guess an economic historian can go through 1000 examples, but the

automobile is the best. It was not necessarily entirely an American invention, but the mass production was. And we were so used to those automobiles being American that, when they ceased to be American, it caused a lot of trouble in our society.

But you mentioned three things -- semiconductors, fiberoptics, and I will add another: superconductivity, the most important piece for science since the jet. Now, these are all American inventions or discoveries -- you can't describe superconductivity as an invention; it is a discovery, but it will have technological uses.

Fiberoptics was discovered, invented, and produced in Corning, New York. They immediately set out to sell it around the world, because it is one of the most extraordinary bits of communicating devices that has ever yet been found. I you had it in mind to do, you could send the King James Bible 600 miles in one and a half seconds, and there is no equal in its capacity for transmission of information. And Corning right away set out to sell it around the world.

They didn't get much into Japan -- they sold "a few yards' as they say -- but around the world they were all going to use it from Corning. Pretty soon, however, there will be a day when Korea ships it back to us.

In the meantime -- superconductivity -- two months ago at the American Physical Society of New York there was a

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meeting on superconductivity in which papers were read, limited to five minutes, excepting for a few very distinguished people who were allowed to give their papers for 10 minutes. And they went on from 9:00 in the morning until 3:00 the following morning. I mean, American science on top of the most extraordinary thing since the discovery that copper could conduct electricity.

Now, we are going to learn how to make that; we are tops in ceramics in the world; and we are going to be planning to go all around the world and say, "We have got for you the most extraordinarily efficient device for the transmission of energy in the history of the race and the subject." Now, is that targeting?

The Chairman. Senator, may I respond somewhat to that?

I think the example that you cited is a good one, on ceramics and on fine glass. And what we have seen and have been given notice of is that the Japanese have called together industry members that deal in fine glass, and they have called together the scientists, and government, and they will issue "a vision" -- as they term it. And within a couple of years during that time you will see the market close in Japan, if they have decided that is an industry they want to promote for export. They will close that market. They will work at developing the marketing of that product in a coordinated effort by government, the scientists, research and

industry. And you can bet that the primary target will be the United States market, with its enormous consumption.

That is the kind of educated mercantilism that we are seeing take place around the world.

Senator Moynihan. Yes.

The Chairman. That is targeting, and that is what we have been subjected to.

Senator Baucus. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Baucus. Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow on a little bit with an observation about superconductivity.

I understand that the Japanese have already dedicated \$300 million to the research and development of superconductivity. There is a meeting in Tokyo coming up where over a thousand different Japanese are coming together to figure out how to divide that pie, \$300 million, so that they can develop superconductivity.

Now, it seems to me that targeting is an illusive term and difficult to define, but it seems to me it is a lot like due process. That is an illusive term. You know, that is difficult to define. It is a like a lot of concepts that we run up against.

Frankly, I think in this case, the Japanese getting together to dedicate a certain amount of fundsand a certain number of personnel, that may or may not be targeting depending

upon whether it is to just develop the material and the new technology for their industry and for mankind, or whether it is designed to perniciously adversely knock down Americans, or to be against Americans, or to take advantage of Americans.

I frankly think that, just as we want due process provisions written in our Constitution, it also makes sense for targeting to be an actual unfair trade practice, and we are going to define targeting as we move along, as to what is and what is not targeting.

But I do think that the pernicious side of targeting really has to premise the assumption of a trade war, where it is "us" taking advantage of "you."

We want to raise not only the American standard of living but raise, frankly, the Japanese and West European and all people's standards of living. So, we don't want to turn back the clock of technological development. If there is a way for a country to organize to develop technology, that is good for the world. But it is not good for the world if that country which develops that new technology does it in a way to somehow take advantage of or hurt or harm another country.

So, I just firmly believe that we do want to make targeting an actionable provision under section 301, and we are going to cross this bridge many, many times as to what is and what is not targeting. We are going to round out this definition as we proceed. But I think it is wrong for us to

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say that it should not be actionable, because that then says that everyone is out for himself in a way that I think is going to create more subsidies, is going to create more distortions of the marketplace.

The fact is, too, in my view, I don't worry about mirror legislation. I don't worry about it because what we do in this area is not going to be nearly as objectionable, in my view, as what a lot of other countries are doing.

So, let us cross those bridges when we get to them; but let us at least set the tone and start us off in the right direction to be a leader in the world and say that targeting should be actionable.

The Chairman. I think one of the points made, of course, is how do you define it, how do you recognize it? Mr. Woods says we recognize it when we finally see it. Well, because of not being able to be that specific, we say "an unreasonable trade practice" and we give discretion to the President, when it is recognized, to take some action against it. We don't mandate that; it is discretionary. We give him several outs on that deal.

Senator Durenberger. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Just a brief response. The S. 490 defines export targeting as "any government plan or scheme consisting of a combination of coordinated actions, whether carried out severally or jointly, that are bestowed on a

specific group enterprise, industry, or group thereof the effect of which is to assist the enterprise, industry or group to become more competitive in the export of any class or kind of merchandise."

Now, I don't know whether that helps anybody recognize it when it comes along. It helps me feel more positive about making trade policy, if we all agree that trade policy ought to be market-opening, not market-closing.

My concern for putting this in here is twofold: Number one, the Ambassador has already said "however targeting can be recognized, it is already actionable." If we add export targeting to section 305, we in effect are saying we are taking another step forward to say we are against it, whatever it may be.

I think the example of superconductivity is an important example. I don't know that anybody here thinks we ought to let the Japanese go ahead and take over the world of superconductivity. But if we are going to arrest that in some way, you don't do it by accusing them of export targeting five years from now, you do it by setting a deliberate course in America today to make American superconductivity commercially viable and to make the export of that technology competitive. And yet, if we chose to take that course, that would be "export targeting," conceivably, by this definition, and we would be in trouble.

The third reason is that we have a GATT process coming up that has deliberately on its agenda this whole subject.

So, why prejudge it at this stage? Why not let that agenda address this very important issue?

The Chairman. Well, let me say, thinking of that agenda that we have before us, if we can summarize this -- I think the two sides of the argument have been well developed, and I hope we are prepared to vote, unless there are further comments.

Senator Chafee. I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that the gathering that Senator Moynihan referred to was a gathering of private individuals; it wasn't a Government-sponsored gathering. Our Government isn't hip-deep into the present activities in the U.S. on superconductivity. Our Government isn't keeping out other nations' superconductivity materials or developments. And their government is involved in this. That is a key difference from what takes place in this country and what takes place in other nations. And a factor in this is the closing of the markets.

I just would briefly say that I don't quite agree with Ambassador Woods' statement that it is already actionable.

Other companies have examined proceeding that route and have decided that that isn't a route that they could follow. In the Hundai Case, which was machine tools, they went another route, because they felt pursuing the targeting route was not

feasible under the existing law.

vote, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Woods. Senator, excuse me.

The Chairman. Yes.

The Chairman. Mr. Woods, we will get to that one later.

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Mr. Woods. There is one issue, if I may, that I would like to bring up in this context that we discussed the other day. As I recall, some members of the committee had some concern about it. That was the specific provisions related to technology transfer, and the potential impact of that transfer on our defense industries, and the fact that this language might provide a barrier to our defense industries in doing the things that they must do commercially to transfer technology.

So, I feel this is an important provision. I am ready to

You will recall we discussed, I believe, General Dynamics and the F-16; I think we discussed Boeing and AWACS and some of the other defense companies, about the transfer of technology as part of their own commercial transactions. I believe that is C.

I don't know whether the Senators have looked at revising that or not, but I do raise it because there seems there was considerable concern about that the other day when we talked about it during the walk-through.

I would like now to deal with this particular issue. 2 I think we have addressed the concerns, frankly, in 490 of 3 Senator Durenberger by giving the President discretion to act, 4 and giving him several outs. I believe it is a responsible 5 approach to it. But let us have a vote on it. 7 Please call the roll. 8 Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, this would be a vote on 9 the Durenberger amendment? 10 The Chairman. This is a vote on the Durenberger amendment to strike the targeting provision of S. 490 11 12 The Clerk. Mr. Matsunaga? 13 (No response) 14 The Clerk. Mr. Moynihan? (No response) 15 16 The Clerk. Mr. Baucus? 17 Senator Baucus. No. 18 The Clerk. Mr. Boren? 19 (No response) The Clerk. Mr. Bradley? 20 (No response) 21 The Clerk. Mr. Mitchell? 22 (No response) 23 The Clerk. Mr. Pryor? 24 Senator Pryor. 25 No.

1 The Clerk. Mr. Riegle? 2 Senator Riegle. 3 The Clerk. Mr. Rockefeller? 4 (No response) 5 The Clerk. Mr. Daschle? 6 The Chairman. No, by proxy. 7 The Clerk. Mr. Packwood? 8 Senator Packwood. 9 The Clerk. Mr. Dole? 10 (No response) 11 The Clerk. Mr. Roth? 12 (No response) 13 The Clerk. Mr. Danforth? 14 Senator Danforth. No. 15 The Clerk. Mr. Chafee? 16 Senator Chafee. 17 The Clerk. Mr. Heinz? 18 Senator Heinz. 19 The Clerk. Mr. Wallop? 20 (No response) The Clerk. Mr. Durenberger? 21 22 Senator Durenberger. Aye. 23 The Clerk. Mr. Armstrong? 24 (No response) 25 The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. No.

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The Clerk. One Yay, nine nays.

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The Chairman. Senator Durenberger, you have until 5:30

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to talk to the rest of the members.

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(Laughter)

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Senator Durenberger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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The Chairman. Senator Baucus?

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Senator Baucus. Mr. Chairman, are you open for further

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amendments?

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The Chairman. Yes.

American stockpiles are so large.

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Senator Baucus. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment that

Essentially, this is an amendment to coordinate the

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I would like the Clerk to distribute, please.

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right hand and the left hand with the USDA and the USTR in

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deciding what benefits to grant U.S. exporters under the EEP,

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the Export Enhancement Program, administered by the USDA; and

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on the other hand, section 301 actions that this country might

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bring against unfair agricultural foreign trade practice.

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Today, as we all know, we have massive surpluses of grain.

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In fact, the American stockpiled surplus is so expensive that

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we are paying more today in storage costs alone than we were

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on the entire farm subsidy program in 1980. We have about

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a billion bushels of wheat, enough to feed 27 loaves of bread

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to every man, woman, and child on the face of the earth --

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Today, under the law, the USDA then grants EEP benefits to U.S. exporters to combat the subsidies a lot of other countries give, the total subsidies paid for wheat. The EC gives about \$100 per metric ton -- it is that great -- much larger than ours. And that is one reason we are losing a lot of sales. In fact, the EEC will surpass the United States as the world's largest exporter of agricultural products. That is in large part due to EEC subsidies.

Now, the problem today is that the USDA, to a large degree, really doesn't know which countries to bring to the matter. With these EEP benefits, it is a little difficult to know what is an unfair agricultural foreign trade practice and what isn't.

So, my amendment would very simply direct the USTR, whenever 301 is brought against a country, claiming that there is an unfair agricultural subsidy, in this case, to within 30 days consult with the USDA to see whether or not this is an appropriate instance for the USDA to grant EEP benefits. If after that 30 days the USTR thinks that, Yes, this is an appropriate case, then he will so advise the President, and the President then must either grant those benefits or, if not, if he decides it is in the country's best interests not to grant those benefits, then he will so report back to the Congress.

It is essentially a way to bring these two programs

together. Right now they are off separately, somtimes in the same direction and sometimes in different directions.

It is my thought that there are a lot of benefits here.

One is that we have all this wheat in storage. It is rotten, just sitting there. And this is also part other commodities, not just wheat, but other commodities in surplus. The storage costs are expensive; it is an ongoing program. It is just a way to basically make our administration of the laws a little more efficient than they now are.

That is the amendment.

The Chairman. But it in no way mandates?

Senator Baucus. It in no way mandates, no. The USTR will consult with the USDA to see if this is an appropriate case. And if the USTR feels, after that 30 days, that, "Yes, this is an appropriate case," and so informs the President, the President then at his discretion will either grant the EEP benefits or, if not, so inform the Congress, including the reasons why.

The Chairman. Mr. Woods, do you have a comment? Or Mr. Holmer?

Mr. Woods. This appears to me to be in the category of another arrow in our quiver, now that Senator Baucus has made the changes to not mandate that we use the EEP benefits.

The Chairman. Yes. I had some concern with it in the beginning. But this makes it acceptable.

Mr. Woods. And in that respect, we are always pleased to 2 have arrows in our quiver. 3 Senator Chafee. You are going to have a lot of them 4 before this bill is finished. 5 (Laughter) The Chairman. Mr. Lang, do you have any comments 6 7 concerning it? Mr. Lang. We worked on this in the staff group, and 8 9 Ambassador Woods is correct: Senator Baucus modified the amendment in response to comments of several offices. I don't 10 know of any objection to it at this stage. 11 The Chairman. Do you move the amendment, Senator Baucus? 12 13 Senator Baucus. Yes, I do. The Chairman. All right. 14 I must say I was distracted when I saw the Chairman of 15 the Budget Committee come in. 16 (Laughter) 17 The Chairman. You have not brought us Reconciliation, I 18 hope, at this moment. 19 (Laughter) 20 The Chairman. All right. 21 Are there objections to the amendment? 22 (No response) 23 The Chairman. If not, all in favor of the amendment make 24 it known by saying Aye. 25

(Chorus of Ayes)

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The Chairman. Opposed, similar sign.

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(No response)

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The Chairman. Motion carried.

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Senator Riegle. Mr. Chairman?

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The Chairman. Yes, Senator Riegle.

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Senator Riegle. Is there another amendment waiting to go at this point? Or would this be a good time to get into the

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workers' rights amendment?

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The Chairman. I think as good as any. Go ahead.

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Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, could we just clear up

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that point that Mr. Woods had on the technology transfer?

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Mr. Lang. Mr. Chairman, if you will look on spreadsheet

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page 63 in the right-hand column, the provision that gives the

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Administration concern is item C at the bottom of page 63.

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These are ideas that would be included but not necessarily be

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the only ways in which export targeting could manifest itself.

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So, "C" is what the Administration has reservations about,

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Senator.

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Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, I have a proposal. If
the Administration could work around with that and come up with
some changes that would relieve them of their concerns, I
for one would be glad to discuss it with them, and we could
go on to something else -- if that is agreeable with you.

The Chairman. Well, you are saying that you will

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discuss it later with them, and we will move on to something else at the present time?

Senator Chafee. That was my thought, that they would come up with the language that eases their concerns, and we could take that up later.

The Chairman. We would be happy to consider it later, certainly.

Senator Riegle?

Senator Riegle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with you, when the Chairman of the Budget Committee comes in, it sends a chill through all of us at this particular point.

(Laughter)

Senator Riegle. Mr. Chairman, I want to circulate now the amendment that I am offering, for myself and together with Senator Heinz, on issue of workers' rights. And I want to make sure that a copy is in front of everybody of the amendment that we will be offering.

This amendment is offered fully in a bipartisan manner. I would note at the outset that this provision that we are offering today was contained in the House version that was put forward by Representative Bob Michel as the Republican alternative in the House. So, this is an issue that has been much looked at and discussed by people in both parties and I think is something that clearly we should incorporate into our bill.

What the amendment would do is, it would make workers' rights around the world a negotiating objective in the new GATT Round. It defines as "unreasonable" under section 301 the denial of internationally-recognized workers' rights, and it provides maximum flexibility, in that the Trade Representative may determine that, if a country is taking steps to demonstrate compliance with the objectives, then no action would be recommended or required.

Now, the law as we have it today already recognizes that when a country subsidizes capital, or dumps its production, we have an example of an unfair trade practice. This amendment extends that concept in principle to human capital.

The fundamental question that we are asking is: Should the exploitation of workers for the purpose of gaining unfair market advantage be recognized as an "unreasonable frade practice"?

Now, this is not a new issue; this is an issue that has been around for many years, and many of the nations that today are carrying out some of the worst kinds of oppressive practices that one can describe have signed international agreements saying that they will not do that, that they will adhere to a different set of standards. They are signatories, for example, to the Convention on Forced Labor, which originated in 1930, has 128 ratifications, including many of the countries today that, of course, are not meeting that

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standard that they themselves agreed to do.

The Convention on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize has 97 ratifications. The Convention on the Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively, which originated in 1949, has 113 ratifications. Again, without going into greater detail, unless there is a desire to do so, there are a number of nations on those lists that today blatantly violate those very conventions.

Now, from both a moral and an economic point of view, I think we should not be forced to compete with labor costing 50 cents an hour or less, the childeren in textile factories around the world working 15 hours a day, or heavy industries all across the globe which do not have any safety or health standards.

As Mr. Frank Fenton of the Trade Reform Action Coalition testified before this committee, "It is preposterous to think that any U.S. industry will ever be able to compete against 15-cent-an-hour labor, regardless of how lean and mean it gets and how technologically advanced its equipment is.

So, the intention of this amendment -- which, by the way, does not require a mandatory action, but it would be actionable -- is to expand world trade by providing for better conditions for workers all over the world. These countries that are practicing these things that we hope to try to see eliminated would not have to be so dependent on exports

themselves, and they would be in a position, in fact, to buy more of the world's goods in the process, which would be very helpful to our ability to do a greater level of exporting, ourselves.

The worker rights defined in this amendment are the same as those defined in statutes governing the generalized system of preferences and the overseas private investment corporation. Hearings have been held on both of these, and the provisions in those areas are being enforced.

I would just conclude by saying that we have broad support for this amendment. The Retail Action Trade Coalition, which has been a group very strongly on the side of free and open trade, which is a coalition of retailers and trade associations, endorses this language specifically. It is obviously a major issue with organized labor in this country and the ILO around the world to try to adhere to some measure of minimum standards of decency in terms of workers' rights.

I have a whole list of horror stories that I won't get into unless we have to, ranging from countries like Korea and Thailand, and many others, where we see — in '80 — some of the worst conditions that one could imagine, where children are sold into labor situations, and where working conditions are almost beyond one's imagination, unless you actually examine what is going on.

So, I would hope that this would be an amendment that the

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committee would see fit to support. There are other groups —
the Catholic Bishops have spoken out very strongly on this
issue. And finally, the European Parliament, just as recently
as in September of this last year, reaffirmed its 1983
resolution for a new GATT Article to be negotiated to cover
fair labor standards, and specifically require member
companies of countries of the GATT to respect the ILO
Conventions.

So I think there is a very strong case here. I think there is a very strong consensus around the world by people who have thought about this issue, who are central within the trading system, to see to it that we move in this fashion, not to try to butt into anybody else's internal affairs -- we don't require standards in other countries -- but to create a situation where living and working conditions around the world can rise, and that we will not find increasing numbers of U.S. workers displaced by products that are cheaper because they are literally extracted from the blood and exploitation of people in other countries who are denied even the most basic rights to try to organize and bargain for themselves in their work situations.

Senator Heinz. Would the Senator yield?

Senator Reigle. I will in just a moment. I just wanted to say I am very pleased to be joined by Senator Heinz, and I know he has a statement that he wishes to make.

Senator Moynihan. Can we not let Senator Daschle ask a question, then go to you, sir?

Senator Daschle. Well, it was more in the form of a statement. For that purpose, I will be happy to defer to Senator Heinz.

Senator Moynihan. Senator Heinz?

Senator Heinz. First, let me say that Don Riegle has done a very eloquent and elegant job of arguing and stipulating the case for this amendment. He has carefully researched the President's laws, the conventions, and he has set those forth I think both accurately and rather powerfully.

This is indeed a very carefully-crafted amendment, and there will be people who will attack it as disguised protectionism. It is not either protectionism or disguised protectionism, inasmuch as the kinds of standards that are set forth are today internationally recognized, they are subscribed to by many, and the amendment has two aspects to it that I specifically want to draw the attention of our colleagues to.

The first is that these kinds of denials of worker rights are designated, when discovered, as an "unreasonable" trade practice; that is to say that action is discretionary with the President; it is not in the category of an "unjustifiable" trade practice. Thereby, I suspect that that gives

Mr. Holmer an arrow in his quiver, even if he doesn't particularly relish the idea of firing it at a target.

Second, the amendment specifically says that you don't even have to find it an unreasonable practice, even if there is not on some absolute scale a sufficiency of these rights, as long as there is some progress taking place.

And it seems to me fairly difficult to take the position as Americans that we are not for the promotion of these kinds of very basic rights. We are talking about child labor being restrained, restricted, proscribed. We are talking about the ability of employees to have some say over how they are treated and how they are compensated. These are not exactly "unreasonable" positions of advocacy for this country to take.

I hope the committee will be convinced that this is not only a non-protectionist amendment, but it is a good and necessary amendment.

Senator Moynihan. I wonder if I might make a quick response in that regard, to say that, far from being a protectionist amendment, the international labor conventions begin as a device for increasing world trade, by enabling nations to be certain that there are essentially equal labor standards as between them, and there is no need to raise tariff barriers to overcome the advantage in price that comes from lower labor standards. It was precisely to the question of increasing trade that the idea of the labor convention first

began.

Senator Daschle?

Senator Daschle. Thank you, Senator.

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The point I was going to make is that a comment I have heard on a couple of occasions is that this is somehow foreign to many of the objectives that we are trying to accomplish in this bill. The point I would make is that it is just the contrary, that this is very much in line — in concept and in philosophy — with the Tariffs and Trade Act of 1984, which mandated that the President not designate as a GSP beneficiary any country that has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally-recognized worker rights to workers in that country.

So, we have ample precedent in current law, not to mention the fact that as an objective of S. 490 we set out "the establishment of minimum standards applicable to the workplace to provide greater international discipline over abuses of the human rights of workers."

So, it is totally, in concept and in philosophy, in line with current policy as well as with the intention of S. 490.

I think it elaborates and more concretely defines our intent in this regard. So, I think it is an admirable amendment.

I emphasize what Senator Heinz has indicated, that this is a discretionary matter for the President and the USTR; and, in that regard, I think it fits practically as well as

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philosophically with our intent in this bill.

Senator Moynihan. Senator Chafee?

an action lies.

Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important that we realize that this is a very, very major amendment that Senator Riegle is presenting. This isn't just something that deals with employing children at slave wages; this is an amendment that says, "If a country denies the right of association" -- namely, unions -- "or denies the right to organize and bargain collectively" -- i.e., unions -- that

Now, what we are saying is that, a fortiori, an action lies against all the Communist bloc countries, including, of course, the Soviet Union and China, and it lies against other countries such as Korea.

Now, to say that the President has discretion I don't think addresses the problem. What we are saying here is that we are not going to purchase goods from the Soviet Union or from China unless an exception is made. And therefore it is clear that those countries aren't going to change their ways because of a 301 action by the United States. It means, therefore, in effect, that they are going to retaliate — there is no question about it. Why should China buy any goods from us if we are not going to buy any goods from them? Why should the Soviet Union buy any of our wheat or agricultural products, as they have done in the past? They have been the

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principal purchaser of agricultural products from the United States in many years, and there is no doubt that they will be again in the future.

I noted the concern that Senator Baucus indicated regarding exports of agricultural products, and that is one I share. I think we would be making a grievous mistake to cut off those markets from ourselves.

I have here a letter from the Secretary of Labor, Secretary William Brock whom we all know and respect, in which he says the Administration opposed the provision passed by the House Ways and Means Committee -- that is the so-called "Workers Rights" -- "and I urge you not to accept the provision in the Finance Committee." And there is a copy here addressed to Mr. Rostenkowski in which -- I will just quote this -- "And therefore a good case in point is the members of the Soviet Bloc. They are the world's worst offenders of workers' rights, and they are not going to change their labor practices due to a section 301 case. Therefore, in a complaint involving the Soviet Bloc we would have two options: one, retaliate against Soviet imports; or, two, do nothing. If we retaliate, they will undoubtedly take counteractions against U.S. exports. If we do nothing, how can we justify applying this provision to any other country?"

Mr. Chairman, there are ways of proceeding on this, and I think we ought to look into it further, and at the proper

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time I will propose that there be appointed a study commission to look into this and see what we are getting into.

But to start here, without knowledge of what we are getting into, seems to me to be a very, very grievous undertaking. And I would hope, at the proper time, when I present the study amendment, that that amendment would be adopted, and that we would not adopt the Riegle amendment.

The Chairman. Senator Packwood?

Senator Packwood. Mr. Chairman, I have some sympathy for the Riegle amendment, but I don't know if I can vote for it.

Maybe I can, but I want to ask some questions.

How do you envision, Don, that it works? You are saying it is discretionary. Senator Chafee is saying, "Well, we are going to have to apply it to the Soviet Union, and that it isn't discretionary, and then we won't buy anything and they won't buy anything."

Senator Riegle. I would say to the Senator, as

Senator Heinz earlier pointed out, this does not mandate an
action; it allows our trade people and the President to look
at the conditions that are going on in that area and make a
judgment as to whether or not the situation is so extreme,
so severe, that it ought to be included with whatever other
direct economic factors are involved in deciding to bring
an action.

Senator Packwood. Wait a minute. But is it discretionary?

If you look at Russia, then clearly you are right -- no right of association, no right to bargain. Now, can the President say, "Yep, they don't allow association, and they don't allow bargaining; I am going to waive it anyway"? Is that what you mean by "discretion"?

Senator Riegle. I would say, first of all, I think the issue as it relates to Communist nations is, if I may say, something of a red herring. I think it is easy to raise those cases. I should think that the weight of argument really ought to be tilted the other way; and that is, if we can do something constructive that tries to break open those systems, in the sense of giving workers somewhat more leverage and try to move those systems, to some extent, in the direction of the way our system works, that we would be encouraging that and not, in a sense, saying that we are going to by and large accept their practices and say we can't do anything about it.

Senator Packwood. Don, let me interrupt and use a different example. The reason I am ambivalent about this is, there is probably no stronger bulwark of anti-dictatorship than free unions. Someone gave me the argument about minimum wage or minimum age. But they are simply anathema to dictatorships, whether they are Russia or Chile or Korea or anybody else.

But I don't understand the waiver process. Let us skip the Communist bloc countries; let us take Korea. They have no

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freedom of association as we mean it, or as you mean it, I think. What powers does the President have to do, the way? That is what I don't understand in your amendment

Senator Riegle. I think Korea -- South Korea -- is a terrific example. It is probably the best example, because they are running enormous trade surpluses, and they are one of the more repressive countries in the world today and particularly with respect to workers' rights. And I have a a number of specific cases in Korea that, if there is a desire to get into them, I will, in terms of workers being beaten, women being tortured, in terms of trying to have meetings to talk together about how they might increase wages, and so forth. So, Korea is a very good example.

The way I would see this working is that the President and his representatives in the trade area would examine what is going on in this area, that this would be an area that would receive very careful analysis. And if a pattern were found of practices along the lines of these lists of abuses, that were in turn converting themselves into a non-fair economic advantage in the trading relationship, that the President would be in a position to take that matter into account with others to decide and make a judgment as to whether or not the situation was serious enough and profound enough to require an action on their part.

Now, I would think in most instances that negotiation

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would follow, that efforts would follow between governments that have a positive relationship to try to work things out.

But in the event that there was a determination that the situation was so extreme, there was no movement, it would give the President the option to bring an action if he so chose.

Senator Packwood. Is this like the non-trade violations on mandatory retaliation, where at the end of it the President doesn't have to retaliate? That is what I am trying to ask.

Senator Riegle. Yes.

Senator Packwood. Okay.

The Chairman. Mr. Holmer?

Mr. Holmer. Senator Packwood, if we could, just on that one particular point, because Ambassador Woods wants to address it more broadly, the mandatory retaliation under S. 490 as amended by the Packwood amendment includes mandatory retaliation for unreasonable cases. It is true that there are some exceptions — you do have a national—economic—interest waiver for the President. But there is mandatory retaliation required for unreasonable cases under which this worker rights provision would fall.

The Chairman. Senator Bradley, you had a comment.

Senator Bradley. I'm sorry, I just came in.

Yesterday I thought it was a mandatory investigation, not mandatory retaliation.

Senator Packwood. As far as "unreasonable" practices,

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as opposed to what we called "unjustifiable" -- non-trade agreements.

Senator Bradley. That is not what the spreadsheet says.

Senator Heinz. Maybe we should ask Mr. Lang, on this.

The Chairman. The spreadsheet doesn't have that amendment.

Mr. Lang. What would happen, in unreasonable cases under the Packwood amendment that was accepted yesterday, is that the President would have to initiate cases, both unjustifiable and unreasonable and discriminatory.

Senator Packwood. Initiate investigations.

Mr. Lang. Initiate investigations, based on those that would work the greatest expansion of U.S. exports or a precedent that would have that effect.

The President would then be required to retaliate, but the list of exceptions in unreasonable and discriminatory cases is longer by one exception than in any of the other cases, and that is the exception Senator Packwood described -- that is, at the end of the process the President can simply declare that he does not believe it is appropriate for the United States to retaliate.

The Chairman. That is limited to the unreasonable cases.

Mr. Lang. The unreasonable and discriminatory cases.

The Chairman. Oh. But as to the unjustifiable, the trade, he has to. But I am trying to figure where this fits

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in now as to what Don is saying and as to what Mr. Holmer is saying.

Mr. Lang. I think, Senator Packwood, what may be causing some confusion here is that, under current law, the word "may" appears with regard to the actions the President can take.

Under both the Packwood amendment and the Bentsen/Danforth bill, the word "shall" refers to the action the President takes; but, nonetheless, your interpretation is correct, in our opinion, that the exception for doing nothing at the end of the course is available to the President in the unreasonable and disriminatory cases.

Senator Packwood. But where does Mr. Riegle's amendment fall? The President goes through the process, says, "This country" -- Borneo, or whatever, but I don't know if Borneo fits these standards or not -- "does not allow worker rights, does not allow collective bargaining," and only by an absolute breach of fact-finding investigation can he come to a conclusion that they fit into these, so he says, "They don't fit," they don't do this. Then what does he do? At that stage can he say, "We are going to waive it"? Or under Mr.Riegle's amendment at that stage does he have to have some kind of mandatory retaliation?

Mr. Lang. Senator Riegle's amendment, as we read it, explicitly provides that it is in the unreasonable category; it is an amendment to the definition of "unreasonable."

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Furthermore, he has an additional loophole for the President, which is a special rule for determinations involving worker rights, and that is that the Trade Representative can determine that the practice is not unreasonable if the foreign country has taken or is taking steps that demonstrate a significant and measurable overall advancement to afford throughout the country the rights and other standards described in the amendment.

So, there is actually an additional escape clause for the President under Senator Riegle's amendment.

Mr. Holmer. But Senator Packwood, I just want to make sure there is no confusion that, for these unreasonable cases, the President is required mandatorily to retaliate unless he takes one of the exceptions that is given to him. And as a practical matter, you can be assured that the U.S. Trade Representative or the Administration will be strung up by their thumbs as a political matter to require that they provide that they do take mandatory retaliatory actions as mandated under the law unless the President exercises one of those waivers.

Senator Packwood. There was confusion about the amendment yesterday, because I copied a part of the Chairman's amendment on this, redefining the language a bit. But under "unreasonable" -- Lloyd, you correct me if I am wrong -- neither of us mandated retaliation at the end of an

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"unreasonable violation."

The Chairman. That is correct.

Senator Packwood. For an "unjustifiable" one, we did.

The Chairman. That is right.

Senator Packwood. And I just don't know which category this falls into.

Senator Riegle. It is precisely the same category; it is in the "unreasonable" category. Action is not mandatory. It requires a decision by the President. There are bases upon which the President can hang his hat in deciding not to act. I would maybe try to phrase it slightly more elegantly than to call it a "loophole," or a "Presidential loophole" --

Mr. Lang. I beg your pardon, sir.

Senator Riegle. But the fact is that the President not only has the latitude to evaluate those practices as against the economic conditions in those countries and the state of development in those countries, but also he has an economic national self-interest argument from the point of view of the United States that can also be applied.

But clearly, there is no ambiguity. It falls into the category, Senator Packwood, of the "unreasonable" side of the ledger where actions are not mandatory and the President does have the option not to act on the basis that I have described here.

The Chairman. Well, that was certainly the intent of the

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language in the Bentsen/Danforth bill, and as amended by Senator Packwood. There was no question about that.

Senator Baucus. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Senator Baucus.

Senator Baucus. Now I am confused, frankly. I thought I understood Jeff Lang to say — and I think you have corrected maybe Jeff's understanding, or perhaps my misunderstanding. I thought I heard Jeff say that actions that are unjustifiable, and in actions that are unreasonable, that the USTR is mandated to begin initiation, and mandated to take retaliatory action —

Mr. Lang. No. No.

Senator Baucus. -- except, if unreasonable, there is an additional waiver that is not available in the unjustifiable case.

Mr. Lang. I see. There is that semantic difference, but the committee has been using the word "mandatory" to mean the cases in which the President does not have the option to do nothing at the end of the process. "Non-mandatory" has meant that the President has the option to do nothing at the end of the process. That is what the Chairman means.

Senator Baucus. All right. Just so I understand it: under "unjustifiable cases" the USTR is mandated to both initiate the investigation and take the action, retaliatory action.

Mr. Lang. In fact, there is no distinction between any of these cases with regard to initiation. He is simply mandated to initiate cases.

Senator Baucus. He is mandated.

Now, in unjustifiable cases, what are the obligations of the USTR?

Senator Packwood. He is mandated to retaliate, but we have four exceptions.

Senator Baucus. All right. The exceptions only apply, then, to the unjustifiable cases?

Mr. Lang. One technical correction: It is not the USTR, it is the President.

Senator Baucus. Well, the exceptions then apply only under "unreasonable"?

Senator Packwood. That is correct.

Senator Baucus. All right.

The question I have, Mr. Chairman, is: Does the action that might be contemplated under the amendment offered by the Senator from Michigan necessarily fall into the category of "unreasonable"? Or might it also fall into the catetory of "unjustifiable"?

Mr. Lang. His amendment provides, in its terms as we understand it, that it is "unreasonable." And it also provides some additional flexibility that would not be available for other unreasonable cases.

Senator Baucus. I understand the additional flexibility, but as the amendment is drafted, it could not be in the category of "unjustifiable" -- is that correct?

Mr. Lang. That is right, because it is a definition of the word "unreasonable."

Senator Baucus. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Moynihan, you had a comment?

Senator Moynihan. Yes.

Mr. Chairman, let me see if I can't sort my own thinking on this just a little bit, first of all to say I support the Riegle amendment, and I cannot think -- perhaps I could get the attention of my friends?

Having raised the matter in this committee, I don't see that we have any choice but to approve it. I think there is a matter of history here that is of importance.

As I remarked to Senator Heinz earlier and very briefly, when he was saying this is not a protectionist measure, indeed the whole notion of the Labor Convention commences as an effort to expand trade in situations where countries —

European countries — were erecting trade barriers to protect themselves against the lagging labor standards of their trading partners.

The notion was very simply, if we all get together and agree on a 40-hour week, if we all get together and agree on certain provisions of worker safety, and so forth, then we

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we will never find ourselves competing by the process of lowering labor standards.

The earlier example, and perhaps the first, was the Plimsoll mark that you see on shipping, that they would not compete for shipping, maritime nations wouldn't compete for trade by maintaining unsafe vehciles. And you still see that Plimsoll mark alongside.

Now, it happens that the United States labor movement took a lead in this. We first adopted law -- we adopted the statute in 1907 on sulphur matches. Children used to suck off the edges of matches and die from them, and there was a treaty agreed to in Europe that nobody would make them. We wouldn't sign the treaty, but we passed the law. They were cheaper, but they were dangerous.

Then, at the Paris Peace Conference, Samuel Gompers, the head of the AF of L, was made Chairman of the Commission that drew up the charter of the International Labor Organization, and the first meeting took place here in Washington.

The United States joined the ILO, when it did not join the League, and it did not join the World Court. I think we have ratified five treaties, none on labor conventions, all having to do with maritime rights.

Now, having said that, it seems to me that for us not to commit ourselves to these most elemental of the ILO conventions is to repudiate part of our history. But, also be

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clear that what Secretary Brock has said is probably also so, that the President will find himself certifying that there are no trade unions in Saudi Arabia, and there is nothing he can do about it, and we have to trade with them; and that there are no trade unions in Korea that are worthy of the name, and yet we have to trade with them; that there are none in the Soviet Union is obvious; and that in a whole number of indeterminate states it is not so much a matter of doctrine as it is a matter of power, there are no trade unions.

There are about 40 countries in the world which have free trade union movements, and about 110 that don't. And we trade with those other 110, and some we trade a great deal with. And the President will end up having to certify that they don't have these things which we claim to be very important, and yet our economic interest overrides our ideological interests. Yet, I would make the one compensating thought, that the original purpose of these movements was not purely in a human rights area but was in fact very much an effort to advance trade. So, if they are not perfectly adhered to, they are not walking away from our commitment to the human rights aspects.

The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Moynihan.

Senator Danforth?

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, I have several questions.

I think Senator Chafee was asking for recognition, maybe before

I was.

The Chairman. Senator Chafee?

Senator Chafee. I would like to ask Mr. Woods: Is it essential that the unfair worker rights result in any impact in trade under the Riegle amendment?

Mr. Woods. Yes, I believe that is right.

Senator Packwood. I didn't understand the answer.

Mr. Woods. Yes. There would have to be a burden or restriction on U.S. trade, but --

Senator Chafee. I would be interested, Mr. Woods, in your views on this.

Mr. Woods. Well, first of all, this Administration strongly supports worker rights. We have worked very hard to get worker rights to be a portion of the negotiation in the Uruguay Round.

Ambassador Yeutter, as some of you may know, was accompanied by representatives of the AFL-CIO to Punta del Este for the purpose of trying to get worker rights on the Uruguay Round agenda. We are still trying, and we plan to continue to try in that respect.

The problem here is that there is no international consensus at this point that denial of worker rights is a legitimate basis for trade sanctions. That is what we would be trying to achieve in the Uruguay Round. So, we would be acting alone and unilaterally in declaring that such was the

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the case.

interpretation.

In fact, there is really not much in the way of international consensus as to what constitutes an unfair worker rights practice in a trade context. And even the ILO standards, as Secretary Brock states in his letter to you, tend to be very general in nature, leaving wide latitude for

Our concern here is that we might be required to close down markets, given the nature of this provision. We could accept Senator Riegle's suggestion that we be required, as part of our negotiating authority in the Uruguay Round, to negotiate on this. That is what we want to do, and we would very much appreciate the Senate's support for that activity. But we must oppose, I believe, the use of section 301 as a provision in international worker rights at this time.

The Chairman. Gentlemen, are we prepared to vote?

Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment to

Senator Riegle, and an amendment that I would like to

circulate now.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Chafee. What this does is, it establishes a workers rights blue ribbon commission, in which, "90 days after the enactment of the trade bill, the Secretary of Labor shall establish a commission to examine the effect of this type of provision, and the commission will report back within

a year."

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Mr. Chairman, I move this amendment, because I just think we are getting into heavy weather here in the Riegle proposal.

And I must say I do find it a little bit objectionable, the proposal or suggestion, if I understood it correctly, by Senator Moynihan that we will have these provisions but rather ignore them -- "Korea doesn't have a union set up, so therefore the President just will declare an exception; that Saudi Arabia doesn't have unions, we recognize that, so just declare it an exception."

I don't think we want to enact laws with the objective that the President will just merrily have exceptions to them.

I don't think that is what we want to do.

Senator Moynihan. Could I ask my friend, are you objecting to what I said because I said it, or are you objecting to the prediction I made?

Senator Chafee. Well, it wasn't more of in a prediction, it was rather a suggestion, as I understood it.

Senator Moynihan. On a point of personal privilege, it was no such thing at all. I said I think we should realistically accept that in doing this we were in keeping with a long American tradition, and that, in keeping with present realities, the President would find himself -- a President would find himself -- making many exceptions.

Now, if you object to that, that is different.

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Senator Chafee. Well, so be it, and I won't pursue that, except to say I urge the members, my colleagues, to adopt this amendment that I have proposed here, so that we will know what we are getting into.

As you know, I feel deeply concerned about the proposal of Senator Reigle, as to what it is going to do to our trade. It is odd that many of us are involved with competitiveness activities here. Clearly, this makes us noncompetitive in many areas of the world. I don't see how we can ever expect to sell anything else to the Soviet Union if this legislation should be enacted, unless cynically we expect that the President is going to declare an exception to the Soviet Union because they represent a pretty good market.

But as far as Korea goes, Korea has got a surplus with us; so he will impose it against Korea.

Just yesterday we all saw the article, perhaps, in the New York Times, "Japan Winning Race in China -- persistence, patience, key. Chinese imports in 1986" -- and showing that Japan has 29 percent of the market and the U.S. has 11 percent. I am not clear, but I suspect we probably got a mild surplus. Do we, in our trade with China? Do you know, Mr. Woods?

Mr. Woods. No.

Senator Chafee. We don't? I don't know -- whatever it is. But the opportunities are there, whether it is for

Boeing Aircraft, or whatever it might be, to sell in China -IBM, or whoever.

And yet, we are saying today, if we pass this legislation without further consideration, that China is out. There are no trade unions in China; nobody suggests there are. But if my amendment should not be adopted, and the Riegle amendment were adopted, that would be the result.

So, therefore -- Senator Danforth has a question here, but I would propose that -- I suppose the proper thing would be to have mine -- is it procedurally correct to have mine a substitute, Mr. Lang?

Mr. Lang. Yes, sir, that is what we understoos you wanted to do. Yours would be a complete substitute.

Senator Chafee. Rather than an amendment?

Mr. Lang. Yes, sir.

Senator Chafee. Well then, which one would we proceed to vote on? Mine first?

Mr. Wilkins. Under the committee rules, the Chairman may put the amendments in the order he thinks appropriate.

In considering a substitute for an offered amendment, it probably would be appropriate to consider the substitute before the underlying amendment. That is the normal Senate procedure.

The Chairman. That is normally our procedure, is it not?

Mr. Wilkins. That is correct. That is the normal

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procedure on the Senate floor.

The Chairman. We will follow normal procedure on that, and the vote would come first on your substitute. That is just the way we do it on the floor of the Senate.

Senator Chafee. If everybody has a copy, at the proper time -- I am not trying to cut anybody off, Mr. Chairman, but at the proper time I would move my substitute.

The Chairman. We will see that there is full debate on it.

Yes?

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, I have some questions for Senator Riegle.

First, in his description of his amendment, he referred to "patterns and practices." What I wanted to make sure was that that is the intent of the Senator's amendment. other words, a single act or a single incident would not trigger even discretionary use of section 301; but rather, what the Senator is after is a pattern of behavior which is the violate of labor rights.

Senator Riegle. I would say yes, and I would go even: further than that: I think it has to be a persistent pattern. I think you have to have, really, a very substantial showing -not individual cases, but I think you have to show really a general pattern of the denial on a broad scale.

Bear in mind, there is a second aspect of this, and even

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that has to be judged against the level of development of the country involved. We are not trying to mandate standards for other countries, per se, by any arbitrary yardstick.

So, you know, every country is sort of moving along at a different level of development. But where there is a broad, pernicious pattern that is clear and obvious, that is what we are really addressing here.

Senator Danforth. All right. I want to get to that level-of-development question in just a minute; but I wonder if you would be willing to write into the text, or if we could agree now that if your amendment is agreed to by the committee, the staff would be instructed to write into the text of your amendment that what we are talking about is a pattern or practice of behavior rather than a simple act.

Senator Riegle. Than an isolated incident? I would be inclined to say Yes; but my colleague and cosponsor Senator Heinz — I would be very much interested in his view on that as well. And I might say, too, that Senator Mitchell is also a cosponsor of this amendment, and Senator Moynihan.

Senator Heinz. I have always construed the amendment to not target one or two acts, but a pattern or series of practices. And I would have no objection, Don, to our accommodating Senator Danforth to make that explicit, to the extent it is not explicit.

Senator Riegle. Do you know, It seems to me that in

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a sense we are creating a legislative history here, and I think it is understood what we are saying.

I think my preference would be, in light of the fact that that is the clear intent, having now stated it here, that we put it in the committee report rather than -- I mean, I am always a little edgy about going into a rewrite on the amendment itself that sort of goes off into another zone. I would rather nail that down as explicitly as it needs to be in report language so there is no confusion.

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Senator Danforth. I would suggest that it be put into whatever language gets out of this committee. I think that it is very important that it be written in the bill, because we all know that the business of trying to construe legislative intent is very iffy. It involves not only what was said in committee, but on the floor where people oftentimes put written statements in the Congressional Record as though given, which nobody has ever heard before, which is supposed to create legislative intent.

And I really think that if our intention is to address patterns and practices as opposed to isolated acts, that it is very important that that be written into the legislation.

Senator Riegle. Let me say to the Senator, I very much would like to have the Senator's support. And if we can find a way to craft this in a way that lets him feel that he can support it, I would feel much better about the amendment.

If phraseology such as the kind we have been describing here are a consistent pattern, or words to that effect, is something that you feel strongly we ought to have, that is clearly my intent. So lets try to work that out.

Senator Danforth. Before I sign on to the amendment, I have some other questions. But as I understand your answer, it is conditional to my support of the amendment?

Senator Riegle. Well, I agree with the Senator and I

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am prepared to go that way. But if I am going to make a whole series of adjustments and then find that we haven't gotten to the point where we can support it on a broader basis, then I guess I would like to think about it again. But I would like to accommodate the Senator if I possibly can.

The Chairman. I think what he means is he wants to know what the final price is.

(Laughter)

Senator Danforth. Let me ask a second question and relate it to a question that was put by Senator Chafee and answered by Ambassador Woods.

But is the objective here to get at sprayed practices or matters that affect trade, or is the objective to basically use sprayed as a tool of foreign policy or human rights objectives?

We have had this ongoing question that has been raised by Senator Armstrong relating to slave labor in the Soviet Union, and it comes up from time to time.

And Senator Moynihan has argued this, I know, on the floor. We have argued it with each other on the floor, the extent to which trade should be used as a sanction for other practices that are really unrelated to trade. Should the United States refuse to deal with the Soviet Union because of its human rights violations? Should the United States

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refuse to deal with South Africa or with this country or that country because of human rights violations?

And my understanding of what Ambassador Woods responded was that this amendment is specific trade. In other words, this amendment does not authorize the President to use Section 301 for matters that are extraneous to trade. We are not going to use this as a foreign policy weapon or a human rights weapon, but only use it insofar as the various matters that are complained of here do have trade effects.

Senator Riegle. If I can respond.

I think you have put in a very profound way the new reality that we face, and it is clearly trade related and only trade related, and not an effort to try to reach through and tamper tinker with the practices in other countries.

And I think this is why the support developed as strongly as it did in the House, which has been at this issue longer, and why this provision became a provision in Congressman Michel's Republican version in the House, indicating a very broad sort of bipartisan concensus on it. And it is that the world trading system has now connected itself so fully as we see, as why we are having this hearing. And with trade moving the way it is back and forth in increasing volumes and velocity, us running a deficit last year of \$170 billion, that these issues now take on a very powerful economic meaning and impact. And our workers in

this country now finding themselves in a new kind of international economic relationship with workers in other countries.

And so it is no longer just a matter of a moralistic assessment as to what may be going on in another nation. It is the scale of the world trading volume now lifts this up to take on an economic impact that is very real in terms of its effect on our trading balances and on our own workers and living standards in this country.

Recognizing that, this amendment is not trying to be punitive as such. We recognize that there are different levels of development in the world, but we want to take account of the fact that these conditions can now start to yield an enlarging economic effect that come right straight through in terms of the trade balances that can be very destructive to our country.

In fact, if you extend this argument longer enough you could get to the point where we could see great pressure that sort of pull standards in this country down to the lowest common denominator around the world, all other things being equal, to put ourselves "in an economically competitive situation."

Obviously, we do not want to do that. We think there are some minimum standards on child labor and on the length of the work week, and work place hazards, and so forth.

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Now other countries do not agree with us. They are not quite as far along as we are in many cases, and we are not trying to impose our standards on them. But this allows to take account of the fact that because the world trading system now has changed into the new system that we now have, that there are powerful economic trade realities. So it is all trade centered. It is not to try to reach in and --

Senator Danforth. Then let me, if I could, ask

Mr. Lang, is it clear, in your opinion, in the way the

amendment is written that it has an exclusively trade

effect? In other words, this is not an effort to use trade

for matters that are unrelated to their trade?

Mr. Lang. This amendment, Senator Danforth, is a definition to the word "unreasonable". In order for an unreasonable practice to be actionable under Section 301, you not only have to find that the foreign practices unreasonable but that it burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.

Senator Danforth. All right.

Mr. Lang. That is the connection I was making before. Senator Danforth. So it is absolutely clear.

Now a final question. Senator Riegle has mentioned in his discussion several times now in our conversations the question of level of development, the level of development. Does that modifier apply to all of the worker rights issues that are enumerated in the amendment, or does it apply to

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only the one relating to standards in minimum wages, hours of work, occupation, safety and health?

Senator Riegle. Those are the ones we specify. And the reason for doing so, if in setting aside the right to association and the right for workers to try to bargain for themselves, in a sense, that is the first spark of workers being able to take and try to assess their condition and decide if they want to try to move in the area of the ones that we actually spell out, to try to move in the direction of minimum wages or hours of work or occupational health and safety.

So in a sense, the most elemental right is the right even to sit down and have a conversation on that.

I have cases that I have not cited here--I would be happy to--of extreme cases in places like South Korea, which run huge trade surpluses with us, and countries like Chile, and others, where even that initial step of workers trying to talk to one another about how they might change their working conditions, where workers have been brutalized, have been beaten, been murdered, well documented cases.

And so in taking into the level of economic development, I have enumerated only those areas of minimum wages, hours of work and occupational safety and health, and left out what I think is across the line in the other area, and that is just sort of the basic human right of workers

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to be able to talk to one another, to see if they can organize.

Senator Danforth. What would the Senator's view be of defining that modifier, "level of economic development", to all of the workers' rights?

Senator Riegle. Well, I would like to think about that for a moment. In my own mind, I sort of see a difference in kind there. But I would like to think about it a little more.

Let me ask Senator Heinz if he has what you want. Senator Heinz. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Heinz.

Senator Heinz. I would make a very real distinction between the rights of association, the rights to organize and bargain collectively, first. And the fifth part of Senator Riegle's amendment. The first several I don't think should be qualified by taking into account a country's level of economic development.

It would imply to do so that you would not want if you had a low level of economic development to permit collective bargaining. And I would think that we would not want to go on record as saying that if you were hypothetically in a country where there was an exploitation for trade purposes of an underclass, that that would be okay as long as the country were poor enough. That seems to me to be a flawed

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principle.

I would say to Jack Danforth that he made, I thought, earlier a very important point, and that is that this amendment is trade related, not human rights related, per se. And that the reason for it is to take into account the kinds of activities that that could have an impact on trade, and that, conversely, it is not an amendment that gives a President a means of using trade to affect some kind of policy or human rights initiative that such a President might feel strongly about.

I think that is clear from the way the amendment works. Senator Danforth. Let me just say this.

If the amendment were modified in the two respects that I have suggested, one, relating to the pattern of practices, and, two, relating to the level of economic development, meaning to all of the areas, I would not have any problem. I would be willing to support it.

I think that the level of economic development is simply, as I understand it, what the President has taken into account. I think that with respect to, say, the generalized system of preferences, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, we have recognized as a matter of policy that there are certain instances where the basket case, nature of the country, calls for a different type of consideration on the part of the United States.

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And it would seem to me that those are -- those two changes are important changes. But I don't have a laundry list for you. I don't have a list as long as your arm that if you change this then lets go into the next item. But I do think that those two would be a major improvement. And if it could be improved, I would be willing to support you.

Senator Riegle. Well, let me make it clear. I certainly accept the first, and I think I may very well be inclined to accept the second. Patterns and practices, I think, ought to be in there, and I think it is a very valid point to make.

Let me to test a second. When I think in the case of, say, a nationwide Korea, in my own mind today, it would seem to me that by any reasonable standard that Korea is a major -- has come forward as a major nation. They would not be in the basket case variety, South Korea.

And if we are going to have the ability to assess countries in terms of where they are, the case of a Korea, on the one hand, versus a Bangaledesh, on the other hand, might be a case -- would be a case where Korea clearly would be expected where they are to allow rights of association, and the rights of workers to organize and collectively bargain. I think they have got trade surplus with us this year of \$15 billion, and they are doing very, very well.

Is that what you have in mind, of being able to have

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the flexibility in here of making that kind of differentiation but not to use it in such a way as to rule out --

Senator Danforth. Yes. I don't express any position one way or another on the Korea question. That is debateable. It is still covered by the GSP, and some people have said it should be out. Last year it was out in the bill we introduced. I don't express any view on one country versus another. But what I am saying is that I think that these are all great goals. I would be hard pressed to differentiate among them.

I think that to the extent the world moves in these directions, we are going to have a much better situation, not only in those countries but in the United States. And I think that these should be objectives of the United States.

But basically what we are saying, the whole way this is written, and with the explanation that Senator Moynihan has, is that this is going to be something that is viewed on a very flexible basis. We are not going to rule out 110 countries or so and not do business with them because of this provision in the law. And, therefore, it seems to me that it is important to spell out that we expect flexibility on the part of the Administration.

First, we do not expect that the Administration to be legalistic in singling out the one Act or two.

Second, that we would expect the Administration to see

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countries in the light of their level of economic development in applying it.

Senator Packwood. Does that mean, Jack, that a poor country can deny the right of association and the right to bargain, but at some place it passes a threshold of prosperity and then it cannot do that?

Senator Danforth. I think that the whole thrust of this amendment, as I understand it, has been not to be extremely precise and legalistic in the way that it is written, and that I don't think that there is a particular level that would be, you know, for all times viewed as that point at which a country would shift from having these rights applied to it and not apply to it. But I do think that an Administration, in dealing with this kind of provision, has to take into consideration both the political and the economic realities of the situation. And I think that this says the level of economic development modifier says that the Administration does take that kind of thing into consideration.

The Chairman. Let me say to the members of the committee that I think there has been a constructive exchange of opinions here, and the debate has spilled over on both the substitute and the underlying amendment. And I hope that we can summarize our comments and get a vote. I would intend that we vote, first, on the substitute, if

there is no objection, and follow that, if the substitute does not prevail, with the underlying amendment, if there is no objection.

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, I don't intend to debate this any further, but I would like to know the answer to the proposition that I put to Senator Riegle before I vote.

The Chairman. Are you prepared, Senator, to comment on this?

Senator Riegle. Yes, I am. We are all thinking as we are talking here.

The Chairman. Well I can ask as some others are trying to speak if you want further time to think about it.

Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Chafee. I am ready to move the substitute.

And I would say that all of this discussion has shown to me,
and I hope to all of us, the need for the substitute.

All we are saying is, let's pause for a year and look this over and decide what we are talking about. This is really -- I cannot stress enough the substance and the major impact that this amendment is going to have on our trade relationships. And I just hope that we pause for a minute and take a look at what we are doing. And I hope we would not pass an amendment and say, well, we are going to pass the

Riegle amendment, but just remember there are so many loopholes that there are ways around it. I don't think that is the way we want to legislate. And I would hope that there would be support for my blue ribbon -- proposed blue ribbon commission, which has to report within a year, and we can revisit this again and follow the recommendations of the commission, at least have the benefit of their thoughts into this very, very major piece of legislation.

The Chairman. Senator Roth has been seeking recognition. Senator Roth.

Senator Roth. Mr. Chairman, I missed part of the discussion, but perhaps certain of this was covered. But for my benefit, I would like to ask Mr. Lang and possibly Senator Riegle.

I am still not clear what discretion is within the President under this proposal. I am very sympathetic to the objectives of the legislation. But under a 301, normally an unreasonable abuse is found for the White House to take mandatory action. But what provides the rationale for making exceptions in the amendment? In other words, let's take the case of the Soviet Union. I think most of us would agree that there certainly aren't the benefit of collective bargaining there. How does the President make a finding or ignore that fact?

Mr. Lang. There are two basis of flexibility in the

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The Chairman. Senator Packwood.

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amendment beyond those that would be available on the unreasonable track of 301.

First, the President may determine that an Act, policy or practiced described in the amendment would not be unreasonable if he finds that the country concerned has taken or is taking steps to demonstrate a significant and measurable overall advancement to afford throughout the country to write some standards and questions.

Senator Roth. But taking the Soviet Union, that would be very difficult to make that kind of a finding, wouldn't it?

Mr. Lang. Well, I would defer to the Administration, but I suspect to.

Senator Roth. Mr. Ambassador?

Mr.Lang. There is one other element of flexibility, and that is, as it is currently drafted, with regard to the element of the amendment relating to a failure to provide standards for minimum wages, hours or work and occupational safety and health, the President is to take into account the country's level of economic development.

Senator Packwood. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me take a whirl at this answer, because I don't think Mr. Lang is talking about the same thing I thought we were talking about yesterday.

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Senator Packwood. As proposed by Senator Riegle, this is not a violation of the trade agreement. There is no trade agreement on these. We wouldn't be discussing these if we had a trade agreement on them. This is an unreasonable practice.

Mr. Lang. Yes, sir.

Senator Packwood. And at the end of it, the President has total discretion to say, despite all of this, I am just not going to do it. He has to go through the findings. He has to say, yes, you bet they're violating worker rights. And they have only got a 3-year minimum age for children to work, and they still allow bamboo scaffoldings, and all those things. And I am going to ignore all that. And there is no mandatory power to make him act, as I understand what we mean by "reasonable violation" as opposed to "unjustifiable violation," -- unreasonable violation.

Are we clear on what we meant yesterday, because I think this falls under the unreasonable category?

Mr. Lang. It does fall under the unreasonable category. And in that category provided the President can at the end of the process make certain findings and take no action at all.

The Chairman. Gentlemen, are we prepared to vote?

Senator Wallop. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to, if
I may, make an observation because the conversation here

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has told me precisely what I did not want to hear. The basis for flexibility mean that this is a tool for selective retribution, not for the advancement of a philosophy. Since it is trade related and not foreign policy related, is it then sector specific? Is it that we just want to have labor unions where they build automobiles but where they have-prisoners in the forest trapping animals and the furs are not a part of it? And we don't do it. That is sector specificity. And the lack of specificity in this is denying the right of association.

Now what to hell does that mean? At what level it permits any former force to compulsory labor? Does that apply to us with prison labor? Taking into account a country's level of economic development fails to provide standards for minimum wages. Who judges the validity of those standards? We are going to say my standard is 2 cents an hour, and my standard is 10 hours a day, seven days a week. And my standard is that we will provide bandades if you cut yourself. But that is it. All it says is "provide standards."

So what you have devise here is not a means of seeking to protect the world workers. What you have devised is a means by which you can take out a little trade store sort and do battle. It isn't the moral position at all. It is, in fact, a venal little policy tool to achieve a trade-related

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event, not a labor-related event. And to that extent, I could not support it.

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Senator Riegle. Mr. Chairman, let me if I may, after conferring with Senator Danforth. I want to find an agreement with him on that second point as well as the first point, and that would be to have an understanding that in this assessment that is made, if a case is brought, there's a finding of fact, the President and his advisors are able to take into account a country's level of economic development as it would relate to all of the items that we enumerate here, I am not sure there is really a difference when all is said and done, if we have a pernicious persistent pattern going on in a nation that has become a trading nation of consequence in the world trading system-certainly a nation of consequence within the trading system going on within the United States in a major way--then it seems to me that that kind of country would find itself having graduated up into a category of economic power and consequence, where I think by any reasonable standard they should be expected to be moving in all of these directions. And I don't think that most reasonable people would argue with that if we went through a process of a case being brought, a finding of fact, an establishment of the pattern, and so forth.

So I think that we can accept that second suggestion of

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broadening this in that respect, because I think, in effect, that that doesn't really violate the intent of what we are hoping to accomplish here.

Senator Danforth. Well, I would say to the Senator that I appreciate his understanding and accommodation on that basis with both of those matters taken care of. That could be done is the draft is accepted?

Mr. Lang. Yes sir.

Senator Packwood. The President just says this country isn't quite rich enough yet to have worker rights in essence.

Senator Riegle. Well, if I may say, I don't think it is as simple as that. I mean, the President has to finally make the value judgment, and if the President says, look, even though we see things out here that we think are bad and things that we wish were different, he makes a finding based on an assessment of where that country is and he decides to not decide to try in some way to act against.

That is a judgment that has to be made. But, bear in mind, there is a whole process that goes on before that. And I think that the facts in the case--how powerful they are, in essence--guide the decision at the end.

I don't view any President as being somebody who wants to torpedo the intent of the law if the finding of fact is powerful enough.

The Chairman. Gentlemen, are we prepared to vote? Do

you move your amendment, Senator Chafee? 2 Senator Chafee. Yes. 3 The Chairman. Substitute is offered if you would like 4 to call the role -- all those voting for or nay. 5 The Clerk. Mr. Matsunaga? 6 Senator Matsunaga. Nay. 7 The Clerk. Mr. Moynihan? 8 The Chairman. Nay by proxy. 9 The Clerk. Mr. Baucus? 10 Senator Baucus. Nay. 11 The Clerk. Mr. Boren? 12 (No response) 13 The Clerk. Mr. Bradley? 14 (No response) 15 The Clerk. Mr. Mitchell? 16 Senator Mitchell. Nay. 17 The Clerk. Mr. Pryor? 18 Senator Pryor. Nay. 19 The Clerk. Mr. Riegle? Senator Riegle. Nay. 20 The Clerk. Mr. Rockefeller? 21 Senator Riegle. Nay by proxy. 22 The Clerk. Mr. Daschle? 23 Senator Daschle. Nay. 24 The Clerk. Mr. Packwood? 25

1 Senator Packwood. Yea. 2 The Clerk. Mr. Dole? 3 (No response) The Clerk. Mr. Roth? 5 Senator Roth. Yea. 6 The Clerk. Mr. Danforth? 7 Senator Danforth. Nay. 8 The Clerk. Mr. Chafee? 9 Senator Chafee. Yea. 10 The Clerk. Mr. Heinz? 11 Senator Heinz. Nay. The Clerk. Mr. Wallop? 12 13 Senator Wallop. Yea. The Clerk. Mr. Durenberger? 14 Senator Heinz. Nay by proxy. 15 The Clerk. Mr. Armstrong? 16 (No response) 17 The Clerk. Mr. Chairman? 18 19 The Chairman. Nay. The Clerk. 4 Yeas, 12 Nays. 20 The Chairman. All right. The vote will now proceed on 21 the underlying amendment, the Riegle amendment. 22 Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, could I just say one word? 23 The Chairman. Yes. 24 Senator Chafee. A couple of words. Again, I want to 25

stress the importance of this amendment, what its effect is, what its effect really is going to say that there won't be trade, but trade and the right of action will lye against all the communist countries, and I think this is specifically oriented at a non-communist country -- Korea.

I think that seems to be from the drift of the conversation and the illustrations here. And what it means -- we are not going to change the patterns in those nations, but it certainly is going to be, I believe, disastrous to our markets, our opportunities to sell in those countries.

Senator Packwood. Could I say one thing then?

Senator Chafee. And when we are talking about

competitiveness, this is the ultimate of anti-competitiveness

to agriculture and other products.

The Chairman. Let me say that we had agreed that we would proceed right to the next vote and I have let Senator Chafee speak. And I think in fairness, I better let the proponent now reply, if you have anything.

Senator Riegle. I'm prepared to vote, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. All right. Would you proceed to call the role.

The Clerk. Mr. Matsunaga?

Senator Matsunaga. Yea.

The Clerk. Mr. Moynihan?

The Chairman. Yea by proxy.

1 The Clerk. Mr. Baucus? 2 Senator Baucus. Yea. 3 The Clerk. Mr. Boren? 4 (No response) 5 The Clerk. Mr. Bradley? 6 Senator Bradley. Yea. 7 The Clerk. Mr. Mitchell? 8 Senator Mitchell. Yea. . 9 The Clerk. Mr. Pryor? 10 Senator Pryor. Yea. 11 The Clerk. Mr. Riegle? .12 Senator Riegle. Yea. 13 The Clerk. Mr. Rockefeller? 14 Senator Riegle. Yea by proxy. 15 The Clerk. Mr. Daschle? 16 Senator Daschle. Yea. 17 The Clerk. Mr. Packwood? 18 Senator Packwood. Yea. 19 The Clerk. Mr. Dole? (No response) 20 The Clerk. Mr. Roth? 21 Senator Roth. Yea. 22 The Clerk. Mr. Danforth? 23 Senator Danforth. Yea. 24 The Clerk. Mr. Chafee? 25

Senator Chafee. Nay, 2 The Clerk. Mr. Heinz? 3 Senator Heinz. Yea. The Clerk. Mr. Wallop? 5 Senator Wallop. Nay. 6 The Clerk. Mr. Durenberger? **7**. Senator Heinz. Yea by proxy. The Clerk. Mr. Armstrong? (No response) 10 The Clerk. Mr. Chairman? 11 The Chairman. Yea. 12 The Clerk. 15 yeas, 2 nays. 13 Senator Heinz. Mr. Chairman? 14 The Chairman. Senator Heinz. Senator Heinz. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment on 15 the citrus and pasta -- I have an amendment on citrus and 16 .17 pasta that we would like to have presented. 18 The Chairman. I beg your pardon. Let me intervene for Senator Packwood had a comment on this. 19 just a moment. Senator Packwood. I just wanted to explain this vote. 20 I fear it has become a nullity -- maybe I am happy it has 21 become a nullity. I am not sure which. I think by the time 22 we have added the Danforth language and are going to apply 23 economic standards to all countries for all rights, and the 24 President has almost unlimited authority to make first, the 25

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economic decision if he wants it; and at the end of it has the power to absolutely do nothing, I think we are going to achieve what Senator Moynihan has suggested. We have a wonderful statement of worker rights that any president, republican or democrat, liberal or conservative, when faced with the stark facts of trade, is simply going to ignore.

Senator Riegle. Mr. Chairman, might I just take 10 minutes to thank the committee for its consideration in the I want to thank those who voted for it. we have an amendement that does have very considerable meaning and I am appreciative of that.

The Chairman. I recognize Senator Matsunaga for a procedural point.

Senator Matsunaga. I understand your concern, Mr. Chairman, that I be recorded as having voted "no" on the Durenberger amendment earlier.

The Chairman. Without objection, so be it done. Senator Heinz.

Senator Heinz. Mr. Chairman, the amendment that I am offering would implement the U.S. obligation under the citrus agreement that cut the duties on EC products, but in addition, to ensure that the pasta negotiations that were a part of that settlement are completed by July 1.

It provides that unless the case is resolved by then, imported pasta would be subject to new tariffs, and the amount

of the tariff would be equal to the amount of the EC subsidy. That is essentially what the amendment does.

Let me explain the background to the amendment. We are, of course, dealing with S. 301. And back in 1981, the pasta industry filed a 301 case with the USTR citing illegal subsidies for Italian EC pasta imported into the United States.

The GATT panel found that there were illegal pasta subsidies in Violation Article 9 of the Subsidy Code in 1983 -- four years ago. Since then, the EC has completely ignored the findings of that panel and has, in fact, used a variety of procedural maneuvers to prevent the GATT Subsidy Code Committee from even considering the panel report.

In 1985, the U.S. threatened retaliatory tariffs on pasta, and at that point, the EC entered into an interim agreement promising to reach a negotiated agreement by October 31, 1985 -- that is two years after the panel reported.

At that point, the U.S. agreed to postpone imposition of tariffs. By the October 31 deadline, not only was there no agreement, but the Italian subsidies had actually increased by 176 percent, from 2-1/2 cents a pound in July to 6.9 cents a pound in October.

And so, at that point, in light of those developments,

President Reagan imposed a 40 percent punitive tariff on

November 1, 1985. And then, during the next few months, the

Italians increased the subsidies to offset the tariff, until the subsidy level reached 13 cents, that is to say, 50 percent of wholesale value. So they had more than swallowed the tariff.

And as a result, illegally subsidized pasta continues to flow into the United States and the tariff has been substantially increased ever since then. In August of 1986, the USTR and the European Community reached an agreement on the citrus dispute, and at that point, the U.S. agreed to drop the tariff on pasta, subject to there being a final and permanent agreement by the end of July.

Now, as you can see, what we have is an industry that went the dispute settlement process route, it got a finding from the GATT in its favor, the procedural process at the GATT frustrated them from getting any relief through the GATT as they should have; then along comes the citrus dispute, and they are told you can wait on the sideline.

While they are waiting on the sideline, the Europeans continue -- the EC continues to increase the subsidy so that it is now 74 percent of the wholesale value of the product.

Imports have substantially increased, and as a result, we have kind of a classic case history of how S. 301 can misfire.

Now, the purpose of the amendment is to get the EC to do what they said on a total of three occasions they would do, and that is to enter into an agreement of dealing with pasta

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by the agreed upon date -- namely, the end of July.

This amendment would force them to do that by putting in a variable duty that would offset the subsidy, whatever that subsidy was, so that the duty could not be swallowed by the subsidy. And it does not, however, force a particular solution. It doesn't say that the EC has to agree to get rid of their subsidy -- that is certainly the perferred solution. But, it does permit some other kind of undertaking, compensation in effect, to be a part of the agreement.

I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that we would adopt this amendment. It seems to me that it is in everybody's interest to make sure that both S. 301 and the GATT mean something.

Unless we do get redress by the July 1, 1987 date, I fear that we will have very much weakened and undercut that whole process.

The Chairman. Mr. Lang, would you comment on that?

Mr. Lang. Mr. Chairman, the situation, as we understand it, is as Senator Heinz has described. There was a settlement of the citrus matter after quite a long period of --

The Chairman. 16 years.

Mr. Lang. -- 16 years in the GATT, and there was an agreement then to resolve the pasta matter. The Administration might want to comment on the status of that discussion with the European Community.

The Chairman. Mr. Woods, would you comment?

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Mr. Woods. The pasta negotiations, I think, have been the longest continuous negotiations that has ever occurred in the history of man. But, they are continuing thise week and we do anticipate that we will be able to have an agreement by July 1, 1987. In that respect, we are firmly committed to that date. We told the European Community that in no uncertain terms.

And in mind, it to some degree, moots the necessity for such an amendment, and on that basis we would oppose it.

The Chairman. You would what?

Mr. Woods. We would oppose it.

The Chairman. Now, that gives you another quiver, doesn't it.

(Laughter)

Senator Heinz. Mr. Chairman, let me ask Mr. Woods one question.

The Chairman. You didn't quiver. All right.

Senator Heinz. If you were not to get an agreement with the EC by July 1 -- and I hope you do, because that is not my only objective -- but if you wouldn't, what action would you take?

Mr. Woods. I don't know. I would be prepared to discuss actions at this particular moment, but I think Ambassador Yeutter has made it clear to the European Community in our negotiations with them that we would seek action.

Senator Heinz. Would you consider going beyond a fixed-rate tariff which was the weapon that the President used back in 1985?

Mr. Woods. Senator, we have discussed retaliation before, and we try to be creative when we do those things, and I am not sure we have initiated our creative juices on this yet, so I would not be prepared at this point in time to say what form that action might take.

Senator Heinz. You would agree, however, that the level of subsidy of pasta increased and indeed did swallow the 40 percent tariff. Did it not?

Mr. Woods. And more.

Senator Heinz. And more. And you would agree that all during this period, consistently, the share of market has continually increased.

Mr. Woods. I don't believe that is the case, but I am not certain about that, Senator.

Senator Heinz. I think you will find that your staff is going like this. There is not only yes, yes in their eyes, but there is yes, yes in their heads, too.

(Laughter)

Senator Heinz. Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we could adopt this amendment.

Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Are there further comments? Yes, Senator

Chafee.

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Senator Chafee. Mr. Chairman, my state is not involved in this, except possibly as pasta consumers. But, I haven't heard from anybody on it.

But, I thought we were trying to keep this legislation non-sector specific. Are there going to be a series of amendments dealing with specific sectors like this? If so, I would just like to review what we might have in the drawer.

The Chairman. I must state that I have been urging that we not be sector specific. And I know that we have many of them out there waiting in the wings. Would you care to comment, Mr. Lang?

Mr. Lang. The situation in this amendment, Mr. Chairman, is that you have an outstanding GATT ruling in favor of the United States. But, the provision is specific to the sector's concern.

Senator Heinz, do you care to comment? The Chairman. Senator Chafee. I would be most interested in the Chairman's views if the Chairman is inclined to accept this, that is fine. I assume that would be enunciating a principle and that if we have got something stashed away we might come and see him about it.

The Chairman. Why don't you just roll me on this one. (Laughter)

Senator Chafee. Well, I'm not in the mood to roll the Chairman.

Senator Matsunaga. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. I recognize Senator Matsunaga.

Senator Matsunaga. May I ask Mr. Woods a question?
Will the adoption of this amendment interfere with any
negotiations in which you are now engaged with the EC?

Mr. Woods. Well, it could, sir.

Senator Matsunaga. It could or will it?

Mr. Woods. It could.

Senator Matsunaga. It could, but you are not sure that it will?

Mr. Woods. That is correct, Senator

Senator Heinz. Mr. Chairman, on the sector specific point, I think we have to understand that there has to be a sector specific implementation of the citrus agreement by law. It is in the House bill. And so, to say that there is something wrong with this because it is sector specific would mean that we could not implement the citrus agreement.

And, what I object to is implementing the citrus agreement without protecting the legitimate rights that we say we are trying to protect, that we have been trying to protect since in 1983 and the GATT panel ruled in our favor, and making, therefore, a sector specific deal just for citrus and no sector specific protection for the industry

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that has been had now for four years.

It is correct, is it not, Allen, that you have to have the citrus requirement that you entered into with the EC is to have Congress put into effect the revised duties pursuant to citrus. Is that not correct?

Mr. Woods. That is correct, Senator. I should have made clear that my opposition to the amendment only related to the part relating to pasta. And one of the things that we at the U.S. Trade Representative have learned through all of this negotiation is don't link two disputes.

Senator Heinz. But you did.

Mr. Woods. Yes sir.

Mr. Lang. And I, for my part, should have made clear to the Chairman that the Administration has requested the citrus agreement implementation in its legislation submitted to the Congress.

The Chairman. Well, that is a good point.

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Danforth. This is probably a stupid question; he doesn't know what is going on. But, why in this handout, Senator Heinz, it says that as part of the agreement, the U.S. would lower duties on a number of EC products, including anchovies, juices, and olive oil as part of the agreement to settle the pasta dispute?

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Senator Heinz. The Senator is correct. Maybe Mr. Woods can explain.

Senator Danforth. In other words, as I understand it, another country is caught with its hand in the cookie jar, we take it to the GATT, we win the case; and in order to get the unfair practice removed, we make concessions on anchovies, juices, and olive oil?

Mr. Woods. No, Senator, not exactly. There were other elements of the agreement that was made that went beyond the citrus agreement. In this instance, the European Community, in addition to the citrus actions which they took, also took actions to reduce their duties on—I don't know whether it was just almonds or several types of other U.S. specialty agricultural products.

Senator Danforth. This is an add on.

Mr. Woods. This is an add-on procedure.

Senator Danforth. We don't provide compensation to other countries for settlement. Is that correct?

Mr. Woods. That is correct.

Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Yes. Senator Pryor.

Senator Pryor. I don't know if I am going to support this or not. It looks like it may be supported by the committee. But what I think you have brought up, Senator Heinz, is merely a part of a larger problem. The larger

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problem is agriculture products generally. And you are getting into the citrus and pasta issues, where we really have some major problems before GATT with all agriculture cases.

And, I have an amendement that I am considering, I was not aware of your amendment, that would provide a discretion to the USTR, give him an option, of whether he took agriculture matters to GATT or not. We find that the language in agriculture cases is very, very murky, it is very confusing, it is very nebulous, fuzzy. We find that the cases before the GATT that are going before them on manufactured products are very, very clear

And, if I might ask Mr. Lang this question, Mr. Chairman.

Is not this a part of the general problem of agriculture exports?

Senator Heinz. Let me explain one thing.

Senator Pryor. Yes.

Senator Heinz. There is a part of the GATT that deals very specifically with processed agricultural products, pasta being obviously a processed products. And subsidies of such products, processed agricultural ones, is explicitly forbidden under the GATT. That is why we got the GATT ruling.

I think you are quite right with respect to other areas, there is less clarity.

The Chairman. Let me state that Senator Chafee, in

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thinking about this, because I am troubled by the problem affecting the citrus. I do think there is a legitimate difference here and that you are trying to enforce a trade agreement -- something that obviously has to be done. And on that basis.

Senator Heinz. If I might just add, Mr. Chairman, the citrus element is in our amendment, which they want, the need.

The Chairman. I understand it. And with that in mind,

I can understand the distinction and will vote for it.

All in favor --

Senator Packwood. I wanted to ask Mr. Woods a question.

The Chairman. I thought you were asking for a vote.

Senator Packwood. You are more optimistic than I am about the July 1 deadline in pasta and the Italians from what I have heard. But, on the assumption this bill is not going to be law by July 1 -- and I don't see how we can get it through the Senate and through Conference and to the President signed by July 1 -- are you saying this amendment doesn't make any difference, or are you saying that if you don't get this agreement this is going to be a mandatory re-imposition of the tariff on pasta?

Mr. Woods. Well, as I read this amendment, if it were passed and if there were no agreement on pasta, that this would constitute essentially mandatory retaliation and

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mandatory re-imposition of the pasta tariffs. Yes sir.

Senator Packwood. Well, then I agree with Senator

Chafee. I don't know where he is coming out, but now we are sector specific and we are going to mandate a tariff if you don't make the July 1 deadline -- I hope you do, but my hunch is you won't.

Mr. Woods. Both we and the European Community are committed to that, and as I said, our negotiators are getting tired of talking about pasta. And my personal hope is that we are wearing each other down to be able to get to a resolution of this issue that is fair to the U.S. pasta industry.

Senator Heinz. Mr. Chairman, if I just might say to my friend, Bob Packwood, the reason we are in this very odd box and the reason we have what appears to be a sector specific -- even though it is multi-sector, because it is citrus, then it is almonds, oils, and it is all a variety of processed agricultural commodities -- is the reason that Allen Wood says it is, which is they did something that they are never going to do again, which is they linked two disputes and traded one off for the other.

That is what gets us into this box. And as a result, we are trying to find an equitable way to get out of this box. I would have some difficulty simply supportint the one part of the bill that Allen wants here, which is sector

specific if we can't be sure it is balanced. If they hadn't cross-linked these two disputes, I wouldn't be doing anything. But, they have done it.

Mr. Woods. If I may, we did not trade off one for the other. It has always been our view that we must have a solution to pasta.

What we did was we used pasta as retaliation, as it were, for a dispute which we finally settled, thereby resulting in the lifting of the pasta tariffs which we had applied in retaliation to the activities on citrus. It was never our intention not to continue to pursue the problems we had with the European Community on pasta.

We did think at the time -- it turns out somewhat unwisely, I think -- that we could give the pasta industry some immediate relief by using them as an item, using pasta as an item for retaliation.

The Chairman. Gentlemen, are we prepared to vote on this?

Senator Matsunaga. I might comment, Mr. Chairman, that I gather from the comments of Mr. Woods that the amendment would interfere with the ongoing negotiations, that it would be taken as a retaliatory action on our part, and I think, perhaps, on that basis I would be inclined to vote against the amendment.

Senator Heinz. Mr. Woods, do you really think that,

given the drafting of the amendment, where the EC has said that they will enter into an agreement. The amendment says fine, you can either enter into the agreement, or, in effect, we will offset the subsidy?

Mr. Woods. I, Senator, have gotten out of the business of trying to predict how other governments will react to the things that we do, because they frequently surprise us.

I do think it is possible, as I indicated to Senator

Matsunaga before, that they could react in a manner which

is negative. I certainly wouldn't say that they definitely

would react in that manner.

It is, I should make clear, an item which would be considered mandatory retaliation, and one does not know how they might react to that at all.

The Chairman. If there are no further comments.

Senator Chafee. I take it, Mr. Woods, you would rather not have this amendment. Is that correct?

Mr. Woods. Well, if the amendment were split into two parts in a sense. If we could have citrus part without the pasta part, that would certainly be my preference, yes sir.

Senator Daschle. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes, Senator Daschle.

Senator Daschle. I just have one minor clarification, and that is, if in the event there is not a negotiated settlement, is it Senator Heinz's intention that this

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automatically occurs, or does it give the USTR or the President discretion to utilize this as a tool for implementation?

Senator Heinz. Well, in a sense, there will always be discretion until we enact legislation. But, were the legislation enacted --

Senator Daschle. Let's assume this were enacted.

Senator Heinz. No, it would be mandatory.

Senator Daschle. Mandatory.

Senator Heinz. Right.

Senator Daschle. The President is directed to do this?

Senator Heinz. Yes, and this is a classic example of
an unjustifiable trade action, and the GATT has found it.

And, therefore, it is consistent with what we have in the
legislation which mandates retaliation. The only reason I
am bringing it up at this time is that the disputes on
citrus have been linked with this. And we are required to
act on citrus to implement part of the deal, but a deal which
costs -- at least in the interim -- the pasta industry a good
deal.

Senator Daschle. My only comment is that it appears that we have given significant latitude in so many other parts of the bill to the President and the USTR to determine whether implementation of a certain section is necessary, and it appears that we are precluding him from that option in this

case. 2 Senator Heinz. I think it all depends on whether you 3 want to implement the citrus agreement. The Chairman. All right. Are we ready to vote? 5 clerk will call the role. 6 The Clerk. Mr. Matsunaga? 7 Senator Matsunaga. Nay. 8 The Clerk. Mr. Moynihan? 9 Senator Moynihan. Yea. 10 The Clerk. Mr. Baucus? 11 Senator Baucus. Yea. The Clerk. Mr. Boren? 12 (No response) 13 14 The Clerk. Mr. Bradley? (No response) 15 The Clerk. Mr. Mitchell? 16 (No response) 17 The Clerk. Mr. Pryor? 18 Senator Pryor. Yea. 19 The Clerk. Mr. Riegle? 20 Senator Heinz. Yea by proxy. 21 The Clerk. Mr. Rockefeller? 22 (No response) 23 The Clerk. Mr. Daschle? 24 Senator Daschle. Nay. 25

1 The Clerk. Mr. Packwood. 2 Senator Packwood. Nay. 3 The Clerk. Mr. Dole? (No response) 5 The Clerk. Mr. Roth? 6 Senator Packwood. Yea by proxy. 7 The Clerk. Mr. Danforth? 8 Senator Danforth. 9 The Clerk. Mr. Chafee? 10 Senator Chafee. Nay. 11 The Clerk. Mr. Heinz? 12 Senator Heinz. Yea. 13 The Clerk. Mr. Wallop? 14 (No response) 15 The Clerk. Mr. Durenberger? Senator Heinz. Yea by proxy. 16 17 The Clerk. Mr. Armstrong? 18 (No response) 19 The Clerk. Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Well, that comes with an explanation. 20 I understand the legitimacy of the request, but I am troubled 21 by the sector question, and I vote nay. 22 The Clerk. 8 Yeas, 5 Nays. 23 24 Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman? 25 The Chairman. Yes. Senator Pryor. Moffitt Reporting Associates

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Senator Pryor. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment, and I offer this on behalf of Senator Bensten and Senator Baucus. It is my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that the sheet and the explanation that has been passed out, a further explanation is that under item 1 of this language adding to the definition of "unreasonable", that would be in the statute and Sections 2, 3, and 4 would be merely in the report language. This is the House language, Mr. Chairman.

It is also, as I understand it -- and I hope I am not mis-speaking myself -- I think this is supported by the Administration.

Mr. Lang. It is recommended by the Administration, yes. Senator Pryor. And Senator Baucus, I think, has a statement to accompany this.

Senator Baucus. This amendment, actually, I think is necessary because what it does is it finds not as uniustifiable, but as --

Mr. Lang. Discriminatory.

Senator Baucus. -- discriminatory certain actions, state trade actions which actually violated foreign trade practice. The problem is that countries like Canada deny export licenses to Americans trying to export wheat to Canada.

We import about \$15 million, I think, \$40 million worth, it is a large amount, a very large amount of wheat from

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Canada to the United States, but Canada will not even consider any export licenses into Canada.

In addition, there are other practices that such a discriminatory pricing Canada takes; Australia does too.

Our amendment does not place these practices, does not define these practices within the context of the amendment of other report language. And I firmly believe it is another action we can take to basically knock down some foreign agricultural practices which are unfair -- in this case, state trading.

Mr. Chairman, I move the adoption if there is no --

Senator Moynihan. I wonder if we can't ask Ambassador Woods what the Administration's view would be?

Mr. Woods. If you can give me a few minutes to look at this language. I have not seen it before.

Senator Moynihan. Sure. Mr. Lang, do you want to -Mr. Lang. Mr. Chairman, perhaps I ought to explain
some of the background. This relates to inter-related ideas
having to do with state trading.

The GATT has a provision in Article 17 disallowing state trading on other than commercial bases. Senator Bensten is the sponsor of a provision included in the Bensten-Danforth bill to make that actionable under S. 301, and it is made explicitly part of the definition of

unjustifiable and, therefore, on the mandatory track.

Some Senators and the Administration had reservations about that approach. The first thing the amendment does is place state trading on a non-commercial basis within the definition of the phrase discriminatory, rather than on justifiable. It, therefore, is not on the mandatory track the committee cited on yesterday.

Similar GATT provisions are within the scope of the definition of discriminatory under current law, such as failures of countries to abide by most favored nation treatment or to provide national treatment, which are both within the scope of the GATT.

The second provision includes within the definition of unreasonable a concept the Administration has recommended to the Congress in the President's competitiveness package. It would be to add to the definition of unreasonable an idea of reciprocity. The specific language is in determining whether an act, policy, or practice is unreasonable, reciprocal opportunities in the United States for foreign nationals and firms shall be taken into account as appropriate.

Finally, the amendment Senator Pryor has offered would take certain language that Senator Baucus and he had intended offering with regard to pricing practices of foreign state trading agencies, such as dual pricing, meaning essentially

pricing abroad at below the price for state trading enterprise sales in its own market, and variable pricing, meaning discrimination in the pricing of products sold to foreigners, and make those part of the legislative history defining the concept of state trading.

Senator Moynihan. Mr. Lang, in all of these things there is a question of what we would do. Don't we have a dual pricing policy for rice? I am not sure, but I thought we did.

Senator Pryor. No.

Mr. Lang. I am not familiar with the program, Senator.

Mr. Woods. We subsidize both equally, Senator.

Senator Moynihan. Sir?

Mr. Woods. We subsidize both equally, Senator. Both foreign sales, the marketing loan program results in the domestic price and the foreign price being identical.

Senator Moynihan. Oh, I see. But equally below cost.

Mr. Woods. Yes sir.

(Laughter)

Senator Pryor. Then let me debate that issue a little bit. I would like to say that it is working, the marketing loan is. And we have it now for rice and for cotton. We have seen a 300 percent increase in sales of cotton in the last year and a half, a 72 percent increase in the sale of rice, and we will be discussing the marketing loan with

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Senator Danforth and others here, I imagine, next week as relates maybe to this legislation. But, I would like to just

Senator Moynihan. You won't mind my adding that it seems to be working very well, indeed, for the crowned Prince of Liechtenstein.

(Laughter)

Senator Pryor. I heard my colleague --

Senator Moynihan. \$1.3 million cool cash out of the --

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman?

Senator Moynihan. Senator Danforth.

Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, this amendment has two parts, and one part has been added by Senator Baucus. The question that I have is does the Baucus portion of this get at the same practice we use with respect to our export enhancement program? In other words, does this addition, if we put this in the bill, invite other countries to act against our export enhancements?

Senator Baucus. I might respond to that. It is a difficult question to answer, because in most cases we are comparing apples to oranges here. This is not apples with apples.

Canada, for example, sells wheat in the foreign market at \$3.00 a bushel, but sell wheat in the domestic market at \$7.00 a bushel. That is an example of dual pricing. Do we have dual pricing? No, we don't. As Americans, have a

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wheat board to sell wheat in a foreign market say for \$2.00 to \$3.00 a bushel, and sell it domestically at a higher value. We don't have that kind of system.

So, in certain cases that is apples and oranges. The same with Australia. Australia has variable pricing practice that go around and sell different prices, not the world price, but different prices in order to underbid American, essentially American loan rates on wheat or soybeans or products that have a loan rate.

The loan rate basically determines the part in the world market, and these countries come in just to sell at foreign lower prices.

Now, the EP has a program where we take our surpluses, our giantic surpluses -- there are more surpluses than other countries because of the kind of farm program we have -- and then those surpluses are granted as benefits to those cases where we are trying to compete.

Now, will this amendment we are considering right now result in a foreign country's action against our EEP? I don't think this amendment at all bears on EEP. This has nothing to do with EEP. This is only getting at and said the finding is unreasonable to state trading practice those practices indicated -- discriminatory pricing, as well as a variable pricing. And in addition to that example, a failure of Canada to grant U.S. wheat exports to Canada a

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license whatsoever. That has nothing to do with EEP. We allow Canadian wheat to come to the United States, but \$40 million worth, 15 million bushels worth, that Canada isn't allowing. They say no.

Canada has pulled that without a license. So that has nothing to do with EEP. So, I think the answer, basically, is no. And that is in answer to your question.

Senator Danforth. The problem is this variable price thing. Is the EEP handling variable pricing?

Mr. Woods. It has that effect.

Senator Danforth. And would this be that other countries remembering our actions be included variable pricing in S. 301, would that lead to our export subsidy for export products to be viable?

Mr. Woods. Quite likely.

Senator Baucus. Mr. Chairman, if I might respond to that point. Our EEP is not saying, as say Canada's wheat board selling board selling to lower world markets and higher domestic, nor is the same as Canada's. Because, we, first of all, don't have a set EEP program for wheat under where we sell at say at that lower price.

Our EEP, in this country, has only been used on a reactionary basis, on a reactive basis. We have only used it because other countries have initially sold and had been selling at a lower price. And we have been reacting to a

practice that Canada and Australia have been taking. Now, if we had a consistent price where we initially set the price, Americans initially set the price at the low market, then I think you would have a case here. But we don't do that.

EEP is totally a reaction to another country's action. Second, our EEP effect, frankly, doesn't even get at the price level as low as most other countries. We lose sales. We Americans lose sales because the value, the benefit of the surplus that we grant is a benefit and in most cases does not equal, is not as low as, as a practical matter, the price that other countries initially set.

So, I think, frankly, there is a big difference here. It is not the same.

Senator Danforth. Well, as I understand it, there has been at least an expression of concern by our corn growers, soybean people, and corn growing people as to the effect of this. Senator Pryor, is this part of your amendment? Are you offering this?

Senator Pryor. Yes. This is offered on behalf of Senator Baucus, Bensten, and myself. And once again, it is my understanding that the Administration supports this and this is the same as in the House. Is that correct?

Mr. Lang. Senator Pryor, there seems to be some confusion about exactly what we are talking about here. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, if --

The Chairman. Let me say this, then, if that is the case, because the report I just had was that there is apparently some division of opinion amongst us as to what we have worked out.

Mr. Lang. Yes sir.

The Chairman. Why don't we delay this until tomorrow, if you don't mind. Senator, I think we have gone now until 12:15.

Senator Bradley. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Bradley. Maybe we could dispose of one last amendment if there isn't any objection. Oh, I'm sorry.

The Chairman. I would really like to close it for now and come in tomorrow morning.

Senator Bradley. Fine.

Senator Chafee. If Senator Bradley has the amendment, could he give it to us so we could take a look at it overnight?

Senator Bradley. Sure.

The Chairman. That's fine. Let me state that we will go back in again at 9:30 tomorrow morning. And I must state that at the pace we are going, next week you can look at, we will try to get the clearance to work throughout the day to move on and we might have some night meetings too.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the meeting was recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m. in Friday, May 1, 1987.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the foregoing proceedings of an Executive Committee meeting of the United States Senate

Finance Committee, held on April 30, 1987, were transcribed as herein appears and that this is the original transcript thereof.

William J. MOFFITT
Official Court Reporter

My Commission expires April 14, 1989.

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AMENDMENT ON EXPORT TARGETING

<u>Purpose</u>: The purpose of this amendment is to create greater certainty for a victim of foreign export targeting that non-trade action will be taken to help the industry restore its competitive position if the offending trading partner refuses to negotiate an agreement to deal with the problem and the President decides not to retaliate.

Amendment: If the President is unsuccessful in negotiating an agreement to eliminate and fully offset the effects of an export targeting program and he decides not to take retaliatory action, he must convene a private sector panel (modeled after the Young Commission) to advise him within six months on non-trade measures to restore the competitiveness of the U.S. industry that is the victim of the foreign export targeting. Giving due consideration to the panel's recommendation, the President must implement non-trade measures which he believes will restore the competitiveness of the domestic industry. Such non-trade measures would include administrative actions that can be taken under existing Presidential authority or measures that require special implementing legislation. special authority is required, the President must seek enactment of the necessary legislation to give him the additional authority. The recommendations of the private sector panel and the action taken by the President must be reported to the Congress within 30 days of the private panel's recommendations.

TARGETING AMENDMENT OFFERED BY SEN. DAVE DURENBERGER

Delete Section 305(c) of S. 490 as it relates to defining

Export Targeting as an unreasonable practice.

REVISED SUMMARY OF BAUCUS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT 301 AMENDMENT

OVERVIEW

This is an amendment to increase coordination between USTR and USDA regarding two government initiatives, Section 301 and the Export Enhancement Program ("EEP"). The goal is to use existing programs to help U.S. agricultural exporters compete in world markets.

THE EEP IS AN EXISTING PROGRAM WITHIN USDA UNDER WHICH THE U.S. USES GOVERNMENT OWNED SURPLUSES OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES TO HELP U.S. FARMERS OFFSET FOREIGN EXPORT SUBSIDIES. WHENEVER THE ADMINISTRATION DETERMINES THAT A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT IS SUBSIDIZING ITS EXPORTS, IT IS PERMITTED TO OFFER THESE EXCESS COMMODITIES TO THE U.S. EXPORTERS TO MAKE THEM COMPETITIVE. ONLY SURPLUS COMMODITIES ARE USED. IF THEY ARE NOT USED, THEY PROBABLY WOULD ROT IN STORAGE.

THE EEP MAY BE USED AT ANY TIME, AT THE DISCRETION OF THE ADMINISTRATION. THIS AMENDMENT WOULD PROVIDE THAT USTR MUST CONSULT WITH USDA AFTER THE FILING OF AN AGRICULTURAL SECTION 301 CASE TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS WARRANTED TO USE THE EEP IN THAT CIRCUMSTANCE. IF THE USTR AND USDA DETERMINE THAT IT SHOULD BE USED, THEY SHALL SUBMIT THEIR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE REQUIRED EITHER APPLY THE EEP OR REPORT TO CONGRESS THE REASONS FOR NOT DOING SO. THE PRESIDENT WOULD RETAIN FULL DISCRETION NOT TO APPLY THE EEP, SO LONG AS HE REPORTED TO CONGRESS.

SUMMARY

THIS AMENDMENT COORDINATES THE SECTION 301 PROCESS WITH THE EEP. THE AMENDMENT REQUIRES THE USTR TO CONSULT WITH USDA AND OTHER RELEVANT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF EMPLOYING THE EEP TO COUNTER THE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ALLEGED IN SECTION 301 PETITIONS INVOLVING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. IF, AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, THE USTR DECIDES THAT USE OF THE EEP IS JUSTIFIED, HE MUST SO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS. IF USTR DECIDES THAT USE OF THE EEP IS NOT JUSTIFIED, HE MUST REPORT TO CONGRESS THE REASONS FOR THIS DECISION.

THIS AMENDMENT WOULD PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK TO COORDINATE THE SECTION 301 PROCESS WITH THE EEP. IT WOULD ISOLATE FOR THE PRESIDENT SOME OF THE U.S. EXPORTERS MOST URGENTLY REQUIRE THE ASSISTANCE OF THE EEP. THE AMENDMENT WOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT NEEDLESSLY LOSE AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS WHILE THE SECTION 301 CASE IS BEING CONSIDERED.

NO NEW COSTS WILL BE INCURRED BY THE GOVERNMENT IF THIS AMENDMENT BECOMES LAW. THE AMENDMENT WOULD ONLY HELP THE DIRECT THE COMMODITIES ALREADY ALLOCATED TO THE EXPORT ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM WHERE THEY ARE MOST NEEDED.

Under this amendment, the use of the EEP would be discontinued if the competing exporting nation discontinues the practice that triggered the use of the EEP. This gives our competitors an incentive to discontinue, rather than escalate, their agricultural export subsidies.

- 1) Amends Section 105 of the bill to include the following as principal negotiating objectives in the new GATT round:
 - a) the promotion and respect for worker rights;
 - b) a review of the relationship of worker rights to GATT articles, objectives and related instruments with a view to ensuring that the benefits of the trading system are available to all workers;
 - c) adoption as a principal of the GATT, that the denial of worker rights hould not be a means for a country or its industries to gain competitive advantage in international trade.
- 2) Amends Section 301 (e) of the Trade Act of 1974 to include the following new language:

"The term includes, but is not limited to, any act, policy or practice that --

Subject to subparagraph (B), with respect to workers --

- I. denies the right of association,
- II. denies the right to organize and bargain collectively,
- III. permits any form of forced or compulsory labor,
- IV. fails to provide a minimum age for the employment of chldren, and
- V. taking into account a country's level of economic development, fails to provide standards for minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health
- 3) Amends the appropriate section to provide a special rule for determinations involving worker rights which states:

The Trade Representative may determine an act, policy or practice described in Section 301 (e)(3)(A)(i) not to be unreasonable if the Trade Representataive finds that the foreign country concerned has taken, or is taking, steps that demonstrate a significant and measurable overall advancement to afford throughout the country (including any designated zone within the country) the rights and other standards described in subclause (I) through (V) of such section.

WORKER RIGHTS "BLUE RIBBON" COMMISSION

Add a new section 307 to S. 490 (p.190, line 20), as follows:

SEC. 307. COMMISSION ON WORKER RIGHTS

By 90 days after enactment of this provision, the Secretary of Labor shall establish a commission to examine the effect on the U.S. economy, including trade and investment, of the failure of foreign governments to grant their workers internationally recognized worker rights and to make recommendations on how best to deal with such effects as are found. The commission shall include representatives of the United States Government, U.S. workers and industry, who shall be appointed without regard to political party affiliation. The work of the commission shall receive appropriate administrative support from the U.S. Department of Labor. The commission shall report its findings and recommendations within one year of enactment of this provision.

HEINZ/MOYNIHAN/ROTH/RIEGLE AMENDMENT ON CITRUS/PASTA

Background

In addition to improving access to the European Community for U.S. citrus products exports, the EC-U.S. agreement on citrus (announced on August 11, 1986) provided that the EC would lower import duties on almonds and other nuts while the U.S. would lower duties on a number of EC products—including anchovies, cheeses and olive oil. Also, the EC agreed to a deadline to resolve the dispute concerning EC subsidies for pasta, which a GATT panel had found to violate the GATT Subsidies Code. Under the citrus agreement, the EC must negotiate a resolution to the pasta case by the latter of (1)July 1, 1987 or (2) U.S. congressional approval of the duty reductions on the EC products mentioned in the agreement, such as anchovies, cheeses and olive oil. The U.S. regards the July 1, 1987 date as the deadline for completion of negotiations.

Amendment

The amendment (text of S. 543) would implement the U.S. obligation under the citrus agreement to cut the duties on the EC products. In addition, to ensure that the pasta negotiations are completed by July 1, 1987, it provides that unless the case is resolved by July 1, 1987, imported pasta would be subjected to new tariffs. The amount of the tariff would be equal to the value of the EC subsidy, as calculated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The tariff would change monthly as the EC subsidy changed. A floating tariff is designed to prevent the EC from raising its subsidy to negate the effect of a fixed tariff. The tariff would remain in effect only until a negotiated settlement is reached.

Under the amendment the negotiated settlement would have to result in the elimination of the EC subsidy (as envisioned by the GATT panel) or an offset to the EC subsidy, (which would also be consistent with the GATT panel decision).

In effect it would only take effect if the EC did not agree to a negotiated settlement by July 1, 1987. The amendment is designed to encourage prompt resolution of the negotiations if they extend beyond July 1 by eliminating the incentive of the EC to continue its GATT-illegal subsidies.