February 07,2025

Responding to Evidence of a Treasury Cover-Up, Wyden Demands Bessent Come Clean on Musk Infiltration of Treasury Payment Systems

New Reporting Suggests Treasury’s Claim of “Read-Only” DOGE Access to Payment Systems was False and Musk Personnel Meddled with Code; Wyden Continues Investigation and Demands the Full Truth

Washington, D.C. – Continuing his investigation of Elon Musk’s infiltration of the Treasury Department’s highly-sensitive payment systems, Senate Finance Committee Ranking Member Ron Wyden, D-Ore., today renewed his demand for clarity on all DOGE-affiliated personnel working at Treasury, who has had access to the payment systems, what changes have been made, and what vetting are DOGE-affiliated personnel undergoing. Senator Wyden also sought logs or other IT records that would reflect the level of access granted to Musk-affiliated personnel at Treasury. 

Senator Wyden wrote: “New reports suggest that Treasury’s claim in its February 4th letter that access to the data of the payment systems by Tom Krause and other officials affiliated with DOGE was “currently” on a “read-only” basis was misleading and evasive … If WIRED’s reporting is accurate, the Treasury Department deliberately misled or outright lied to Congress to cover up DOGE’s handling of the nation’s most sensitive financial system. The February 4th Treasury letter stated that individuals associated with DOGE “currently” had read-only access to the Treasury Department’s payment systems when it now appears that at least Mr. Elez had ‘read-write’ access to the system for several days, reportedly executing changes to the code. Treasury’s refusal to provide straight answers about DOGE’s actions, as well as its refusal to provide a briefing requested by several Senate committees only heightens my suspicions.” 

The letter continued: “These reports make clear that Musk and his DOGE functionaries have sought access to the payments system not for an audit, but instead to manipulate the system in order to enact a political agenda. The Treasury Department’s payment systems facilitate nearly 90 percent of all federal payments and more than $6 trillion annually. These mission-critical systems are not to be manipulated or subject to the whims of unelected billionaires or software engineers with fantasies of destroying the federal government from within.”

The questions asked in Senator Wyden’s letter are below. The letter is available in full here. 

  1. Are reports that Elez had “read-write” access to the Treasury payment system accurate? Please answer yes or no. If yes, giving specific dates and times, for how long did he have that access?  Please provide a list of all changes Elez made to the payment system during the time he had “read-write” access. 

  2. Did any other DOGE related officials have “read-write” access to the Treasury payment system? If so, please identify them. Giving specific dates and times, for how long did each additional official have “read-write” access? 

  3. Please provide all logs or other appropriate documentation that accurately reflects the “read-only” or “read-write” access of Elez, Krause, or any other DOGE-affiliated personnel.”

  4. Please define what the Department considers to be “read-only” access to data on the payment systems? Are Tom Krause and other individuals affiliated with DOGE able to download that data? Can any of the data be shared with officials outside the Treasury Department, such as Elon Musk, at any time?

  5. Treasury’s February 4th letter claims that Mr. Krause’s hiring process included a review of his credentials and background, and that his role “demands the same ethical standards of privacy, confidentiality, conflicts of interest assessment, and professionalism of other government employees.” The letter further states that Mr. Krause “is subject to the same security obligations and ethical requirements, including a Top Secret security clearance.”  

    1. Did these same standards apply to the hiring of all other DOGE affiliated personnel with access to the payment systems, including Mr. Elez? 

    2. Were all other DOGE affiliated personnel, such as Mr. Elez, given Top Secret security clearances? 

    3. Reports indicate Mr. Elez has resigned his position due to his links to a social-media account that advocated racism and eugenics. Was this account known to the individuals who conducted his background assessment?  If not, please describe the shortcomings in the background vetting process that led to this oversight. 

  6. Did Dan Katz write senior Treasury personnel directing them to give DOGE affiliated Treasury personnel access to the payment system in order to implement a “pause” on payment instructions on foreign aid or any other component of the federal spending? If so, please provide all correspondence reflecting these discussions.

  7. Please list all personnel affiliated with DOGE who have worked at the Treasury Department or Treasury facilities since January 20, 2025, and please list their current federal employment status and job titles. 

  8. Does Elon Musk have access to the data contained in the fiscal service’s payment systems? If not, will he be granted access? Please answer yes or no.

  9. Did Elon Musk ever seek access to data on the fiscal service’s payment system, or has anyone done so on his behalf? 

  10. Has any data from the Fiscal Service’s payment systems been downloaded onto any servers outside of those that were in use by the Bureau of Fiscal Service on January 19, 2025? If yes, why, and who is now in control of those servers? 

  11. Please provide responses to all outstanding questions from my January 31, 2025 letter. 

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